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ABSTRACT
This research integrates the theoretical perspectives of three separate but related
areas of social-psychological research to hypothesize about relationships between the
emotion of empathy and an individual’s effort to extend helping behaviors to out-groups.
The literatures on social justice, prosocial behavior, and group stereotypes are reviewed.
An experimental study manipulated empathic concern for an out-group by varying the
perspective through which participants interpret an experience that is had by a fictional
immigrant group to America. In addition, the study manipulated the stereotypes that
characterized the immigrant group. The effects of these independent variable
manipulations on psychometric measures of empathic concern, helping behaviors,
identity considerations, and personal distress were assessed. Findings suggest that
instructions to take the perspective of an out-group described as socially cold and
incompetent results in significantly less helping compared to a control group. Results are
discussed in reference to the theory and practice of intergroup relations.

xi

CHAPTER ONE
SOCIAL JUSTICE
In a world with increasingly global undertones, efforts to understand the socialpsychological dynamics that are involved in intergroup helping behaviors are more
needed than ever. The various world media are replete with examples of efforts to
marshal and to increase helping behaviors for various out-groups (e.g., hurricane Katrina
victims, the victims of the earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan, Sudanese refugees). Yet
social psychology, a discipline uniquely suited to provide scientific guidance toward this
end, has yet to develop a theoretical perspective with which to pose questions about when
and why individuals and groups may extend, or withhold, helping behaviors to outgroups. The research reported here attempts to address this void in the literature by
integrating the insights offered by social-psychological approaches to justice, prosocial
behavior, and group stereotypes in order to provide initial understanding of which types
of out-groups are more or less likely to receive help from others.
As societies have evolved, the universality of social justice concerns has emerged from
numerous philosophical discussions, lay people’s reactions to justice and injustice, as
well as empirical research. Social justice standards are of particular interest to social
psychologists because they are both created and maintained by individuals, groups,
societies, and cultures (Tyler & Smith, 1998). Given the consensus across disciplines
such as philosophy, law, political science, and psychology that justice is indeed
1
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important, it is necessary to attempt to understand justice phenomena and their
implications for behavior. The social-psychological study of justice has grown over the
last six decades in response to this need. Contemporary justice studies are attempting to
isolate specific processes responsible for justice effects and have thus become extremely
focused in their approach. The initial investigations into the psychology of justice,
however, formed both the intellectual foundation as well as the theoretical framework
upon which current research is based.
The first two decades of the social psychology of justice evolved according to two
sequential lines of thought. Beginning with social exchange theory and continuing into
the 1960s, distributive justice theories attempted to answer questions regarding how
people evaluate the fairness of the outcomes that they receive from social interactions
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Adams, 1965). Although distributive justice theories vary in
their specific focus and implications, they converge in their shared assumption that the
primary motivation underlying social relationships is to maximize self-interest.
What mattered to people according to distributive theories was having control
over the outcomes of social interactions (i.e., outcome control). Importantly, the
distributive justice theories reflected the reality that people did not evaluate justice
according to the outcomes received from a single social interaction. Rather, this literature
suggested that, to the extent that an individual’s exchange relationships were favorable
over time, individuals evaluated them as ―fair‖ and were likely to maintain them.
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The second major line of thought in justice literature took place in the 1970s,
when researchers began to ask subjects to describe experiences of injustice (Tyler &
Smith, 1998). These individuals did not describe these experiences in terms of unfair
outcomes. Instead, the events subjects described reflected concerns about violations of
interpersonal considerations—elements that were directly tied to group procedures.
Procedural justice theories thus evolved to answer questions regarding how people
evaluate specific procedures that lead to the outcomes of social interactions. A core
postulate of the procedural justice models is that individuals are sensitive to the process
by which decisions are made. In their pioneering work on procedural justice, Thibaut and
Walker (1975) suggested that procedural considerations included process control
elements such as the opportunity to present one’s views (i.e., having ―voice‖), having
those views considered by a decision-maker, and having some control over the
presentation of evidence relevant to decision-making.
As value-expressive theories of justice, procedural justice models suggest that the
elements of process control are valuable in their own right and often are more important
than outcome control. To understand the roots of the relevance of process control, justice
researchers looked to the theoretical framework of social identity theory, which addresses
the general motivation behind individual involvement with groups (Tajfel, 1982). Social
identity theory postulates that an individual’s personal identity and social identity are
components of that individual’s self-concept. Consequently, an individual’s social
identities have direct bearing upon the way that individual evaluates himself or herself.
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Because the core motivation underlying social identity theory is that individuals seek to
have a positive self-concept, the theory postulates that individuals strive to achieve and
maintain a positive social identity. Therefore, people will be more attracted to groups that
achieve this end.
Reflecting the motivational aspects of social identity theory, the group-value
model of justice builds upon the premise that people rely upon the degree of process
control afforded to them in order to glean information about the quality of their social
relationships within groups. Specifically, group procedures for treating individual group
members are postulated to communicate information regarding one’s relative position
within the group, as well as the position of the group as a whole (Tyler, Degoey, &
Smith, 1996; Tyler & Blader, 2002). This information is presumably conveyed by the
relational implications of the extent to which authority figures display neutrality,
trustworthiness, and status recognition towards their subordinates (Tyler, et al., 1996).
According to this perspective, group authorities are considered to be prototypical
representatives of groups; as such, the behaviors of authority figures in groups are
considered salient indicators of group opinions and values. Fair treatment by the group
(i.e., fair procedures), within the framework of the group-value model, transmits to
individuals that they are valued and respected group members. This information, in turn,
has direct implications for self-evaluation, reflecting the core premise of social identity
theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tyler, et al., 1996).
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Despite the focus of distributive justice theories on outcome control and the focus
of procedural justice theories on process control, both types of theories share in common
the fact that they are highly individualistic. That is, whether the motivation is to
maximize outputs or to feel like a valued and respected group member, the level of
analysis that is relevant for these theories is the individual. Reflecting this reality, a vast
body of social justice research now exists that investigates the determinants of justice
evaluations for individuals (Rasinski, 1987; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1987; Tyler,
Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985).
The next development of the social justice literature reflected an interest in the
implications of group-level variables on the justice evaluations of individuals. Some of
this work reflected the fact that different countries around the world had much different
ideas about what was ―fair‖ in terms of democratic representation in government bodies
(Lijphart, 1984), and that to some extent, different ideas about fairness were due to
individual differences in value orientations such as economic individualism (Deutsch,
1975; Rasinski, 1987; Stouten, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2005; but see Van den Bergh,
Dewitte, & De Cremer, 2006, for interesting qualifications). Other research built upon
this general line of reasoning by investigating how different-sized factions within the
same group evaluated the fairness of superordinate group decision-making procedures
(Azzi, 1992, 1993; Azzi & Jost, 1997; Jost & Azzi, 1996).
Reflecting the next logical step, researchers began investigating the relational
implications of the group-value model in organizational contexts and discovered that
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identification with a superordinate group (e.g., a work organization) was associated with
an increased emphasis on relational concerns (i.e., process control) over outcome control
in the context of conflicts among members of different subgroups (Huo, Smith, Tyler, &
Lind, 1996; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998). The overarching concern among
these researchers was whether or not this promotion of relational concerns came at the
expense of an individual’s subgroup identity (defined in this research as ethnicity).
Among those highly identified with the superordinate group, relational concerns were
found to weigh more heavily than outcome concerns in terms of predicting acceptance of
the decisions of a superordinate authority figure, irrespective of whether or not the
decision-maker was a member of the perceiver’s ethnic subgroup. That is, although
members of ethnic subgroups were sometimes faced with an unfavorable decision by an
authority figure representing a different subgroup than their own, if they strongly
identified with the organization, they accepted the decision to the extent that they were
afforded acceptable levels of process control. Unfavorable outcomes in this case did not
come at the expense of subgroup identity. In contrast, it was found that outcome
concerns predicted decision acceptance for those who had weaker levels of superordinate
identification with the organization. Although the research by Huo and her colleagues
(Huo, et al., 1996) was correlational, it was important to the development of social justice
theory because it indicated that the benefits of superordinate identification need not
necessarily come at the expense of loyalty to one’s subgroup. Studies that have
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experimentally manipulated superordinate identification have replicated the dominance of
procedural justice effects among the highly identified (De Cremer, 2006).
Importantly, however, research findings such as these should not be interpreted as
suggesting that outcomes do not matter as long as authority figures give process control
to their subordinates. This is especially important to realize in real-world organizational
contexts in which the potential for authority figures to abuse the non-instrumental effects
of process control is both very high as well as extremely plausible (Lind, Kanfer, &
Earley, 1990). Lind and his colleagues explicitly stated in the discussion section of their
1990 paper that individuals faced with repeated denials of outcomes would not be forever
satisfied by just having their voices heard. A recent meta-analysis reinforces this
conclusion by indicating that while procedural justice considerations like process control
do lessen the negative impact of unfavorable outcomes, they cannot totally eliminate
these effects (Cohen-Carash & Spector, 2001). In fact, in some situations, group
identification may actually exacerbate the impact of negative outcomes, irrespective of
process control. In a revealing demonstration of this possibility, recent research suggests
that, in group contexts in which social identity is relevant, collective outcomes are more
important than voice considerations, and increasing levels of social identification
intensify this effect (Leung, Tong, & Lind, 2007).
Another area of justice research focused on reactions to experiences of injustice
within a group. One such study was conducted in which three-person groups experienced
the same overall level of unfair treatment under one of two conditions: Either the
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injustice was concentrated upon one group member, or the injustice was distributed
across all group members. Participants evaluated the fairness of their experiences both
before and after group discussion (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998). The authors argued
that the discussion would provide a larger pool of instances of fair/unfair actions than
would individual experience. Therefore, these authors argued, it was logical to expect
that individuals would use the discussion information when they generated an overall
impression of their experiences. Results generally supported this argument, but with
interesting qualifications. As predicted, the supervisor was rated less favorably in
concentrated versus distributed injustice conditions, but the relative weight given to the
injustices experienced by another in participants’ fairness evaluations was much less than
that given to personal experiences of injustice. In fact, analyses revealed that it took
roughly three times as much injustice to another to produce the same weight as a small
amount of personally experienced injustice (Lind, et al., 1998).
Of the social justice literature that recognizes the importance of group-level
variables, a vast majority is decidedly intra-group in nature (but see Azzi, 1992; 1993;
Jost & Azzi, 1997; Azzi & Jost, 1996). For example, the group-value model of justice
(Tyler, et al., 1996) has elicited many investigations of how group-level procedures affect
the experiences of individuals within groups. Research that has been conducted from the
group-value model perspective has investigated the efficacy of procedural justice
variables such as process control to ameliorate conflicts among subgroups, but has done
so by implicating the role of an overarching group membership that subsumes the
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different subgroups (Huo, et al., 1996). Thus, although the conflicts of interest in these
studies may be intergroup in nature (i.e., conflicts among different subgroups within an
organization), the processes which are assumed to lead to successful resolution arise from
an intra-group phenomenon that either dissolves or makes secondary the intergroup
distinction (e.g., superordinate identification with the organization as a whole). The
existing group-level social justice literature, therefore, is mostly silent about truly
intergroup justice phenomena.
This limitation in the justice literature may be inherent to the very definition of
justice as we currently understand it. Philosophers throughout history have discussed
justice as a benefit that is (or should be) provided by the state or nation to its citizenry.
Aristotle, in his earliest writings on the subject, suggested that justice referred to one’s
fellow citizens (Balot 2001, 1-44). Although he did not explicitly state that justice did not
apply to individuals outside of that category, he did imply this point by stating that the
law (and thus justice) applied only to citizens of a particular state, and not to those
outside of it. Although he was not a social psychologist in the academic sense, when
Aristotle spoke about justice in these terms, his became the first recorded mention of the
idea that justice was only relevant inside of some shared category membership. To the
extent that this perspective has been historically enduring, it is not at all surprising that
there is very little social justice research from a truly intergroup perspective. Indeed, the
very concept of justice may have meaning (psychologically and sociologically, if not
logically) only for the in-group and thus may be categorically deactivated for outsiders.

10
Within social psychology, Morton Deutsch (1979) was the first to suggest that
there was a ―scope,‖ or a limited range to the social relationships in which justice
principles are applied. The essence of this idea was made formal in the construct of moral
exclusion, whereby certain individuals or groups are perceived to be outside the boundary
in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply (Opotow, 1990). One
way that the limits of one’s scope of justice have been explained is from a moral or
symbolic perspective, which suggests that issues of social identification motivate
exclusion (Tyler & Smith, 1998). Specifically, people react more strongly to injustice that
is done to others if they identify with them in some way. It is much more difficult (if not
impossible) to motivate people to extend justice considerations to members of a group
with which they do not identify (Huo, 1994; Wenzel, 2001; 2002; Lowenstein & Small,
2007). Whether and by what process individuals can be motivated to extend justice
considerations to out-groups without an induction of a common identity is an important
area of both theoretical and practical concern.
How can individuals be motivated to care about out-groups with whom they do
not identify? As indicated previously, the prevailing wisdom of the social psychology of
justice appears to suggest that motivating people to care about the injustices of outgroups without appealing to a superordinate identification is either extremely difficult or
impossible (Huo, 1994; Wenzel, 2001; Wenzel, 2002). Fortunately, however, social
psychology literature outside of the justice tradition suggests that individuals can be
motivated to help other individuals with whom they share no common identity via the
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motivation induced by empathy, defined as an other-oriented emotional response
corresponding to the perceived welfare of a person in need (Batson, Klein, Highberger, &
Shaw, 1995), or more generally as ―emotional sensitivity to others‖ (De Waal, 2008). The
notion of need discussed in the empathy literature is a direct connection to the justice
literature, as previous theorizing has already established that need is a general principle
underlying justice evaluations regarding the well-being of others (Deutsch, 1979).
Furthermore, to the extent that helping behavior can be equated with justice behavior
(i.e., supporting social policies that protect the rights of out-groups), the conceptual
connections between the justice and empathy literatures are clear. If individuals can also
be motivated via empathy to help entire groups (and not just specific individuals that
represent those groups) with whom they do not share a common identity, then there is the
possibility that social justice theory could be extended, via a theoretical integration with
the empathy literature, to a truly intergroup level of analysis.
Empathy’s potential as a theoretical framework for intergroup justice depends,
however, on the precise nature of the motivational underpinnings of helping behaviors
elicited by empathy.
There is significant debate within the field about this issue. These disagreements
will be more explicitly outlined in following sections, but the gist of the divergence is
that researchers disagree about whether empathy is motivated by altruism (a selfless
desire to help another) or egoism (helping the other to somehow benefit the self). To the
extent that empathy elicits helping behavior that is altruistically motivated, an

12
individual’s justice concerns could be extended to out-groups independently of the
process of superordinate identification. To the extent that empathy results in helping
behavior that is in any way egoistically motivated, however, superordinate identification
could not be ruled out as an explanation for extending justice concerns to out-groups. An
egoistic account of the effects of empathy on helping behaviors towards out-groups could
still be beneficial to justice theorizing, however, by suggesting a way to extend justice
concerns to out-groups that is independent of a direct appeal to superordinate
identification.
Ultimately, which account (altruism versus egoism) of empathy’s effects on
helping behavior is correct could be philosophically (and empirically) irresolvable. The
precise motivational mechanisms underlying such effects, however, are of secondary
importance to the more general theoretical question of whether or not people can be
motivated by empathy to extend helping to out-groups. Before this possibility can be
fully appreciated, a more complete discussion of the literature suggesting that people can
be motivated by empathy to help other individuals is necessary.

CHAPTER TWO
EMPATHY AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
Prosocial behavior is defined in the literature as behavior that is intended to
benefit ―one or more people other than oneself ‖(Batson, 1998, p. 282). The importance
of the self-other distinction is hardly a novel one in the discussion of behavior towards
people in need. The intellectual history of the study of human morality has long
acknowledged the primacy of self-interest in motivating behavior. For example, the
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1785/1965) contended that acts of human kindness were
―inherently selfish,‖ and that only acts that were motivated out of a sense of duty were
worthy of praise. Most accounts of prosocial behavior in the social-psychological
literature concede that the default response in most situations is to act selfishly, but argue
that additional mental effort can override the selfish response when one perceives the
needs of others (Lowenstein & Small, 2007; Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Baumeister,
Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009). The mental energy required to maintain such effort once it
is elicited is likely to be substantial. The exhaustive nature of caring for the well-being of
others is well documented by evidence suggesting that proportionately, people donate
more money in response to rare disasters such as hurricane Katrina (which took 1,093
lives) than they donate in response to social problems that are perniciously enduring (e.g.,
approximately 180,000 deaths per month (mostly children under five years of age) due to
infectious diarrhea associated with unsanitary water) (Epstein, 2006).
13
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That more intense human suffering elicits less of a reaction is a phenomenon that
has been explained by the process of psychological numbing, which suggests that as the
raw number of lives at risk increases, people are less sensitive to the value of lifesaving
interventions (Lowenstein & Small, 2007; Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, & Friedrich, 1997).
Paradoxically then, it seems as though the larger and more severe the social problem, the
less likely people are to help others in need. Because of this, organizations that provide
financial relief for long-term human crises advertise for donations by using a single
individual victim to represent the crisis as a whole. Putting one face to a larger
catastrophe leads to what is known as the ―identifiable victim‖ effect, which results in
both more and larger donations to the cause than if the advertisement were to present the
true magnitude of the potential for loss of life (Epstein, 2006). Psychologically, the
identifiable victim effect offers an individual two benefits relevant to prosocial behavior
in contexts of ongoing humanitarian crises. First, a single victim is a sufficient stimulus
to provide the motivation to overcome the selfish default response and donate money to a
cause. Second, and more importantly, donating money in response to a single victim
offers the individual the relatively easy opportunity to bypass the obligation to invest
emotional energy in the plight of all the others in need—aside from the one ―poster
child.‖
Empathy as an Individual Difference Variable
To some extent, the degree to which people are sensitive to the needs of others
(i.e., dispositional empathy) may be rooted in relatively stable personality traits such as
agreeableness (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007). Although many social-
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psychological investigations of the empathy-helping behavior relationship have focused
on experimentally manipulating empathy, Graziano and colleagues suggest that for those
low on agreeableness, such manipulations are less effective in eliciting helping behavior
when the costs of helping are high. When the costs of helping are low, however, empathy
manipulations operate as a contextual reminder to those low on agreeableness that they
should be sensitive to the needs of others. In contrast, people high on the agreeableness
dimension do not seem to be affected by empathy manipulations (Graziano, et al., 2007).
Importantly, exposure to the needs of another does not automatically elicit
empathic concern, even for those who are high on agreeableness. Attributional
explanations of how motivations arise from emotions suggest that exposure to the needs
of another evokes a search on the part of the perceiver for the causes of the target’s
distress. Presumably, of crucial concern for perceivers in these search scenarios are
indications that the responsibility for the target’s need is internal or external to the target
(Weiner, 1980; 1986). These explanations contend that to the extent that a person is
perceived to be responsible for his or her own need, the perceiver is much less likely to
experience emotional responses such as empathy (but see Batson, Polycarpou, MarmonJones, Imhoff, Mitchener, Bednar, Klein, & Highberger, 1997a for exceptions). Thus, to
the degree that a tendency to attribute internal causation to the situations of others is an
individual difference variable, those high on this construct will be less likely to
experience empathy for a person in need unless explicit information is provided regarding
an external cause of that person’s suffering. Similarly, perceivers that believe in a just
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world (i.e., that people get what they deserve), are less likely to empathize with
individuals in need (Lerner, 1980).
Empathy as an Experimental Manipulation
As an experimental manipulation, empathy is presumed to be elicited by
perspective taking, defined as either actively imagining the experiences and/or feelings of
another, or as imagining how one would feel in another’s shoes. Developmental
psychologists have long acknowledged the importance of putting oneself in the position
of another for social development (Davis, 1983) as well as moral development (Kohlberg,
1976). For social psychologists studying prosocial behavior, the value of perspectivetaking manipulations that induce empathic concern for people in need is self-evident. As
mentioned previously, however, there is significant debate regarding the precise nature of
the motivation (altruistic vs. egoistic) that empathy elicits (c.f. Batson, et al. 1995;
Cialdini, 1991). Whereas this literature defines egoism as a motivational state with the
goal of increasing one’s own welfare, altruism is defined as ―a motivational state with the
ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare‖ (Batson & Shaw, 1991, italics added). To
the extent that taking the perspective of another leaves the self-other distinction intact, the
empathic motivation induced by perspective taking can be considered to be altruistic.
However, to the extent that taking the perspective of another results in a cognitive
overlapping of the self and other, the motivation induced by perspective taking would be,
at least in part, egoistic.
Not surprisingly, researchers arguing from the position of the existence of
altruism produce research that supports an altruistic account of helping behavior, but
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researchers arguing from the position of the non-existence of altruism produce research
that supports a more egoistically driven account of helping behavior. Importantly, both
the altruism and the egoism approaches agree that a perceiver is emotionally affected
when he or she observes the suffering of another. What differs between the two
approaches is the understanding of the nature of the pain that is experienced by the
perceiver.

CHAPTER THREE
THE ALTRUISM VS. EGOISM DEBATE
Led by Daniel Batson, researchers from the altruism perspective suggest the
empathy-altruism hypothesis to explain helping behavior. The hypothesis states that
empathic emotions such as sympathy, compassion, and tenderness elicit motivation to
help others, and that the goal of this help is to benefit the person for whom empathy is
felt—hence indicative of selfless or altruistic motivation (Batson, 1991, 1998; Batson,
Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson, Bolen, Cross, & NeuringerBenefiel, 1986; Batson, Dyck, Brandt, Batson, Powell, McMaster, & Griffitt, 1988). In
contrast, researchers from the egoistic perspective suggest that, although empathic
emotions do elicit motivation to help others, the act of perspective taking creates negative
consequences for the perceiver, and thus the goal of helping is either to eliminate or to
reduce the intensity of this negativity (Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps, Fultz, &
Beaman, 1987; Cialdini, 1991; Maner, Luce, Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, & Sagarin,
2002). The benefit to the other that results, while prosocial in the definitional sense, is
selfish in the motivational sense
Affective Alternatives
Researchers disagree with Batson and his colleagues about the variables that
mediate the link between perspective taking and helping behavior. According to Batson’s
critics, apart from altruism, two other explanations for this relationship are equally
18
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plausible. First, it has been suggested that observing the suffering of others leads to
negative affect (e.g., personal distress, fear of negative social sanction for not helping) on
the part of the perceiver, and that it is the need to alleviate this negative affect that
motivates individuals to help others (Cialdini, et al., 1987; Cialdini, 1991; Maner, et al.,
2002). If this is the case, then helping behavior elicited by perspective taking can be
explained by egoism rather than altruism. On a more general level, the ideas put forth in
such negative-state relief models of helping behavior are at least as old as the thirteenth
century, when philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas suggested that the suffering
of others matters most because when we see that others are suffering, we know that their
plight will soon become our own. This knowledge is presumed to produce a variety of
negative emotions, all of which are capable of motivating helping behavior independently
of a pure concern for the well-being of another. Helping others, according to negativestate relief models, eliminates the stimulus responsible for negative emotions within the
perceiver.
In response to the negative-state relief explanations of the empathy-helping
behavior relationship, altruism researchers have asserted that the empathy-altruism
hypothesis does not deny that benefits to the self exist—e.g., a reduction of personal
distress, or avoiding social censure for not helping. Rather, so say these researchers, the
hypothesis claims that such self-benefits are unintended consequences of actions that
benefit another, and that self-benefits are secondary to the primary motive of improving
the situation of the person in need (Batson, et al., 1986; Batson, 1998). Recent research
along these lines experimentally manipulated the extent to which participants were
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induced to value the welfare of a person in need, finding that valuing the welfare of
another explains variance in helping behavior that is independent of the extent to which
participants empathized with the target. These findings suggest that even if empathy
manipulations do lead to motivational conflicts that involve the self, at least some helping
behavior is unique to purely other-related concerns (Batson, Håkansson-Eklund,
Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007). Note, however, that Batson’s own previous research has
suggested that perceived similarity manipulations, in and of themselves, affect the extent
to which individuals value the welfare of a person in need (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein,
1995).
Cognitive-Affective Alternatives
The second major line along which there is disagreement regarding the effects of
perspective taking is grounded in the social identity and social cognition literatures.
Specifically, some researchers draw upon well established social-psychological theories
such as social identity theory and self categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986;
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) to hypothesize about the results of
perspective-taking manipulations meant to induce empathy for others in need. These
researchers suggest that a result of perspective taking is an increase in perceptions of the
extent to which the self and other are similar. This perceived similarity then leads to a
cognitive overlapping of the self with the other (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, Aron, Tudor,
& Nelson, 1991; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, &
Neuberg, 1997). That there is cognitive overlapping between the self and the other
suggests that identity concerns are at least partially responsible for motivating helping
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behavior. Thus, in contrast to the altruism approach to the effects of empathy which
suggests that helping is due to a selfless concern for others, the social identity approach is
grounded in the idea that the emotion of empathy may be associated with a fundamental
cognitive confusion between the self and the other (Wegner, 1980) which results in
perceptions of shared category membership. Presumably, a consequence of this confusion
is that the suffering of others becomes, in essence, the suffering of the perceiver.
That helping behavior may be inextricably intertwined with perceptions of shared
category membership is a possibility that is reinforced by research suggesting that
ostracism, social exclusion, and rejection are causally linked to a reduction of prosocial
behaviors (Williams, 2007). Experimental manipulations of social rejection and exclusion
(i.e., the removal of social bonds) have been shown to significantly decrease prosocial
behavior across a variety of domains, an effect which is mediated by decreases in
empathy towards those in need (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels,
2007). Moreover, other researchers point to the fact that humans are sometimes motivated
by more biological or evolutionary mechanisms to help those who are the most closely
related to themselves (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). In particular, the decision
of who to help is sensitive to the larger social context. In life-or-death circumstances, for
example, the decision of who to help is dominated by heuristic processes that include
inclusive-fitness considerations: People are more likely to help those who are related or
close to them. In more everyday contexts, however, other elements that require more
cognitive elaboration (e.g., what is moral) come into play in deciding to help (Burnstein,
et al., 1994).
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In response to explanations of the empathy-helping relationship that are based on
social identity, Batson and his colleagues argue that empathy, by definition, requires
awareness of another’s distinctiveness from the self, and that the effects of empathy
manipulations on helping behavior are not bounded by the group membership of the
perceiver (Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, & Dawson, 1997). More
fundamentally, it has been suggested that the studies supporting the group
identification/perceived similarity/self-overlap explanations contain a number of
methodological confounds (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005). Specifically,
variables in these studies that were not statistically controlled (the degree of personal
contact between perceiver and target, the degree of personal relevance of the target’s
need to the perceiver, the extent to which the goals of the perceiver and target were
interdependent, and the extent to which the perceiver anticipated future interaction with
the target) could all lead to perceived similarity independently of the empathy
manipulation. Instead of perceived similarity, Batson and colleagues suggest that
―nurturance,‖ as an altruistic impulse, is a more tenable explanation for the effects of
empathy manipulations on helping behavior (Batson, et al., 2005).
The nurturant tendencies hypothesis rests upon three assumptions. First, empathy
is assumed to be an integral part of the human impulse to care for and protect one’s
young. Second, humans are capable of generalizing this impulse to non-geneticallyrelated others. Finally, the extent to which the impulse generalizes to non-geneticallyrelated others varies. It was hypothesized that the effects of empathy would be stronger
for targets who were more childlike, more vulnerable, and/or who needed protection.
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Thus, to the extent that individuals feel empathy based out of a sense of altruistic
nurturance, they should report the most empathy for targets that are relatively helpless.
To the extent that individuals feel empathy based on a sense of similarity, however, they
should report the most empathy for the target with which they are the most similar. In a
particularly ingenious test of these ideas, Batson and his colleagues manipulated
perceived similarity by having four levels of the target of empathy. Specifically, ―Kayla‖
was described as a student, as a dog, as a puppy, or as a child. Results indicated that
participants were more likely to report stronger empathic concern for dissimilar targets
(the dog, puppy, and child) than they reported for the similar student target (Batson, et al.,
2005). That the empathy-helping relationship was the weakest for the similar target
contradicts perceived similarity explanations which suggest that empathic concern should
be the strongest for the targets that are perceived to be the most similar to the perceiver.
Hybrid Alternatives
Some researchers have suggested that the altruism-egoism dichotomy is false (or
misleading), and that altruism is best defined as a continuum that is defined by how much
an individual intends to help another relative to what that individual expects to gain for
his or her self (Krebs, 1991). Others contend that describing the effects of perspective
taking as purely affective (i.e., only empathy arousing) is too narrow, and that there are
also cognitive processes at play, some of which are likely to involve considerations of
self-other similarity (Eisenberg, 1991; Davis, et al., 1996). According to approaches such
as these, perspective taking involves cognitively understanding another’s experience, and
empathy is the emotional response that results. Indeed, as mentioned previously, which
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approach (i.e., affective/altruistic vs. affective and cognitive/egoistic) is a more accurate
account of the empathy-helping relationship may be irresolvable. In any case, the ability
to entertain the psychological perspective of another person has been shown to result in
some outcome (altruism or less egoism) which has been shown to elevate the interest in
another person, relative to one’s own self-interest.

CHAPTER FOUR
GROUP-LEVEL EMPATHY
Whereas previous research has indicated that group-level emotions exist, and that
specific group emotions such as anger and contempt are useful in explaining group-level
offensive action tendencies against out-groups (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith,
Seger, & Mackie, 2007), less is known about positively valenced group-level emotions
that may explain prosocial actions towards out-groups (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi,
Jorge, & Lewis, 2008). Whether empathy exists at the group level in the altruistic (i.e.,
selfless) sense is of particular concern to the prosocial behavior literature generally, and
the intergroup justice literature in particular. There is reason to doubt the existence of
intergroup empathy, however. Previous research of this question has suggested that
dispositional empathy predicts in-group helping behavior, but interpersonal attraction
predicts out-group helping behavior (Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005).
Moreover, researchers have demonstrated that even in a minimal group paradigm,
empathy is actually deactivated for out-groups (Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Seim, 2006).
These researchers suggest that it is not the case that people only help in-group members
and never help out-group members; rather, they suggest that the motivation for helping in
each context is different.
Specifically, whereas the motivation to help in-group members is due to sociocognitive phenomena that result in self-other overlap (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, et
25
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al., 1987), helping out-groups is likely to be motivated by more systematic cost-benefit
analyses, and is therefore less likely in a general sense.
Some positive effects of empathy inductions on overall attitudes towards outgroups has been documented in previous literature, however (Batson, et al., 1997a;
Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). In the evaluative domain, participants that are
instructed to take the perspective of an out-group member indicate an increased valuing
of that person’s welfare. If group membership is salient, this valuing of the out-group
member’s welfare translates to more favorable evaluations of the group to which the
target belongs. Importantly, this is the case irrespective of the extent to which stereotypes
about the relevant out-groups are privately endorsed by perceivers (Vescio, et al., 2003).
In the domain of justice behaviors, taking the perspective of a single out-group member
has been shown to predict monetary allocations to out-groups as a whole (Batson, Chang,
Orr, & Rowland, 2002). Thus, there is evidence that individuals can be influenced via
empathy manipulations to have more positive evaluations of out-groups, and that such
positive evaluations can generalize to increased financial support of out-group causes. It
remains to be seen, however, whether or not these effects can be interpreted as the result
of truly group-level empathy or whether such positive evaluations and allocations are
artifacts of the individual-level empathy felt for the target out-group member.
Despite these potential benefits, sometimes perspective taking can backfire in
intergroup contexts. Specifically, efforts to appreciate an out-group’s point of view can
lead individuals to think about how the relevant out-group perceives the individual’s own
in-group, a phenomenon known as meta-stereotyping (Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki,
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2009). In this particular study, participants low in prejudice evidenced less favorable
behavior towards ethnic out-groups if they were instructed to first take the perspective of
an out-group member—a result that stands in stark contrast to those of previous studies
(c.f. Batson, et al., 1997a; Vescio, et al., 2003). Presumably, taking the perspective of an
out-group member led participants low in prejudice to consider the possibility that the
out-group may have perceived the in-group as highly prejudiced (i.e., a meta-stereotype
of one’s own in-group). The researchers argued that such meta-stereotyping elicited a
sense of in-group threat in low prejudiced participants, which then resulted in lower
ratings of out-groups than was the case for participants high in prejudice who also took
the perspective of an out-group member. The study by Vorauer and colleagues is
important to the present investigation because it suggests that the potential benefits to
out-groups as a result of perspective taking do not hold in all circumstances. Although the
moderator of the effect of perspective taking in the Vorauer study was an individual
difference variable (i.e., prejudice), there are likely to be many moderators of such
effects. One class of variables likely to affect the strength of perspective-taking
manipulations are those that refer to the out-group itself. Are there characteristics of outgroups that may lead to stronger (versus weaker) empathy effects on helping behavior?
Fortuitously, a theoretical framework for investigating questions such as these already
exists in the form of the group stereotypes literature. This literature both describes the
different dimensions along which individuals evaluate out-groups, as well as explains the
functions such evaluations fulfill.
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Group Stereotypes
The potential relationships between justice, empathy, and group stereotypes are
well demonstrated by a recent study suggesting that priming participants with specific
group stereotypes (e.g., black criminals, promiscuous black females) reduces policy
support for black evacuees of hurricane Katrina and black pregnant women in need, but
does not influence responses towards white targets in the same circumstances (Johnson,
Olivo, Gibson, Reed, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2009). Importantly, the interactive effect found
by these researchers was mediated by perceived empathy towards the targets in need:
Primed participants did not report significant levels of empathic concern for black targets.
Johnson and colleagues (2009) measured empathy as an outcome variable, but did not
include a perspective-taking manipulation. The omission of a perspective-taking
manipulation in the Johnson study is important because previous literature has shown that
taking the perspective of another negates the impact of privately held negative
stereotypes on the evaluations of out-groups (Vescio, et al., 2003). Although both of
these studies are provocative, they focus only on racial stereotypes. Thus, the extent to
which their implications can be generalized across different kinds of groups is limited.
However, substantial work has been done in the area of stereotypes about out-groups, and
this work is singularly suited to shed light on the complex relationships between empathy
and out-group helping behaviors.
Stereotypes about out-groups are presumed to be important because they are
functional: They allow for a sense of in-group prediction and control over potential
external threats, and such group threats are presumed to be the motivational

29
underpinnings of discrimination and prejudice (Fiske, 2004). Some out-groups are likely
to be perceived as threatening, whereas others are likely to be perceived as relatively
harmless. All else being equal, individuals may be more likely to help a non-threatening
out-group than they are to help an out-group that in some way threatens their own ingroup (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). A separate but related line of research has already
suggested a similar set of relationships. Specifically, participants that believe they are
powerful (as the result of an experimental manipulation) are more likely to frame social
decision-making in terms of social responsibility, leading them to allocate more money to
those who are described as powerless (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De
Dreu, 2008). Importantly, this finding was explained in terms of empathic concern of the
powerful towards the powerless. To the extent that powerless groups can be even
partially equated with non-threatening groups, the research by Handgraaf and colleagues
(2008) seems particularly relevant to the present research.
The stereotype content model of group stereotypes has been used to hypothesize
about similar effects of the concept of threat as it applies to out-groups. This model grew
out of a need to expand research on stereotype content from a single evaluative
dimension (good vs. bad) to include the reality that out-group stereotype content can be
(and often is) ambivalent (Fiske, 2004; Claussel & Fiske, 2005). The theoretical
underpinnings of the model suggest that when encountering out-groups, perceivers have
two primary needs to fulfill. First, perceivers want to know what the intentions of outgroups are towards the in-group (perceived warmth); second, after intentions are known,
perceivers are interested in whether or not the out-group has the power to effect their
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intentions (perceived competence) (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). The model further
postulates that the content of group stereotypes depends upon the status ascribed to outgroups (which predicts competence) and the extent to which out-groups are perceived to
be competitive (which predicts lack of warmth or coldness). Crossing perceived warmth
with perceived competence results in four quadrants within which groups can be
categorized: warm-competent, warm-incompetent, cold-competent, and cold-incompetent
(Fiske, et al., 2002). According to this framework, out-groups perceived to be warm and
incompetent are the least threatening, whereas out-groups perceived to be cold and
competent are the most threatening (Fiske, et al., 2002).
The warmth and competence dimensions that are outlined by the stereotype
content model have been found to predict specific behavioral tendencies towards outgroups (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Specifically,
this research suggests that behavioral tendencies towards out-groups are determined
along two major dimensions. The first dimension represents intensity of effort: Behaviors
are either active (i.e., effortful behaviors that directly affect the target group) or they are
passive (i.e., less effortful behaviors that still have consequences for the target group).
The second dimension represents valence: Behaviors either facilitate (by actively helping
or passively associating with) the target group, or they harm (by actively harassing or
passively neglecting) the target group. A conceptual crossing of these two dimensions
results in four specific types of out-groups that elicit more specific behavioral tendencies.
Admired groups are perceived as warm and competent and elicit association and help;
hated groups are perceived as cold and incompetent and elicit harassment and neglect;
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envied groups are perceived as cold and competent and elicit association but also
harassment; finally, pitied groups are perceived to be warm and incompetent and elicit
help but also neglect (Cuddy, et al., 2007). The research just outlined does not include
empathy as a consideration. In fact, no research to date has investigated the empathyhelping behavior relationship in the context of the stereotype content model. The existing
research does suggest, however, that the empathy-helping behavior relationship is likely
to be stronger for certain kinds of out-groups than it is for others.
Consideration of the preceding section suggests the potential to address a current
weakness of the empathy-helping behavior literature. Specifically, helping behavior has
been measured as a binary outcome in most investigations (i.e., help versus no help
choices). Rather than a threatening out-group eliciting zero helping behavior from a
perceiver, it is possible that such groups will receive less help than non-threatening
groups will receive. Helping behaviors that require substantial effort and/or a high level
of trust from helpers (i.e., hosting an out-group member in one’s home), for example, are
probably extremely unlikely if the stereotype of the out-group indicates threat. In
contrast, helping behaviors that are less effortful and/or require less trust (i.e., a one-time
only donation of funds to an out-group cause) may be more likely in threatening
situations. It is important to demonstrate, from an empathy-helping behavior perspective,
whether such variations in types of helping behaviors exist. If so, it is important to
document whether such variations are functions of specific characteristics of out-groups
(e.g., those that are indicative of threat).
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More fundamentally, another weakness of the empathy-helping behavior literature
is that studies which have suggested that empathy does not apply to out-groups have not
manipulated empathic concern, via variations in perspective-taking instructions, at a truly
group level. Rather, the limited research that has investigated group-level effects of
empathy manipulations has relied exclusively upon perspective-taking instructions that
lead participants to consider the perspective of a single target person, and have then
measured evaluations of the target’s group and/or monetary allocations to the target
group’s cause. No research to date, however, has instructed participants to consider the
perspective of the out-group as a whole. If it is to be argued that the benefits of empathy
do or do not extend to the group level, it must first be demonstrated that experimental
manipulations that result in variations in empathic concern (i.e., perspective taking) can
be effectively operationalized at the group level.
Summary
The overarching goal of the current research is to investigate whether or not
empathic concern can motivate justice behaviors that benefit out-groups. The preceding
sections have thus reviewed the major insights offered into this question by three separate
(but related) social-psychological literatures: social justice, prosocial behavior motivated
by empathy, and group stereotypes. With very few exceptions, a review of the social
justice literature suggests that justice concerns simply do not apply to out-groups. Rather,
this literature suggests that the very definition of justice appears to be bounded by notions
of shared category membership. Thus, if the goal is to concern perceivers with the plight
of out-groups, the prevailing wisdom of the justice literature is that it may be necessary to
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make direct (or indirect) appeals to a sense of superordinate identity. To the extent that
these appeals are successful, the effect of superordinate identification should be to
dissolve the intergroup distinction and transform thoughts of ―Us vs. Them‖ to thoughts
of a more inclusive ―Us.‖
A review of the prosocial literature, however, may suggest a slightly different
picture. Although there seems to be agreement within this literature that empathy, as an
affective construct, is deactivated for out-groups as a whole, there is evidence suggesting
that taking the perspective of an out-group member can result in empathic concern for
that individual, which then results in increased monetary allocations to the target
individual’s group (i.e., an out-group) (Batson, et al., 2002). Since allocations to groups
are distributive justice behaviors, and since the existence of an ―out-group cause‖ implies
that the intergroup distinction remains more or less intact, the prosocial literature
suggests that at least some justice behavior can in fact be extended to out-groups, and that
it is at least possible that such behavior may be inter- rather than intra-group in nature.
However, because the perspective-taking instructions in all of the existing studies instruct
individuals to consider the situation of a single individual rather than the situation of a
group as a whole, it is impossible to argue that benefits to the target’s group reflect
intergroup phenomena.
Finally, a review of the out-group stereotyping literature suggests that even if
empathic concern does exist for out-groups, the relative magnitude of such concern is
likely to vary according to the specific characteristics (i.e., stereotypes) that are
associated with a particular group. For example, the stereotype content model suggests

34
that when individuals encounter an out-group, they are primarily interested in divining
the answers to two questions (Cuddy, et al., 2007). First, individuals want to know the
out-group’s intention toward their own in-group: Is this group warm or cold? Second,
individuals want to know if the out-group can effect its intention towards their in-group:
Is this group competent or incompetent? To the extent that an out-group is considered to
be cold and competent, that group is considered to be threatening to one’s in-group
position. That empathic concern for these types of groups would motivate helping
behavior is indeed unlikely. A warm and incompetent group, however, is not threatening
to the in-group, so empathic concern towards such groups (if it exists), may be more
likely to motivate helping behavior. Indeed, previous work has shown that whether or not
individuals extend helping behaviors to out-groups depends on the different stereotypes
associated with those groups (Cuddy, et al., 2007). It remains to be seen what motivates
this behavior, because the group stereotypes literature is, for the moment, absent any
mention of the possible role of empathy. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether these
effects of group stereotypes would persist in the context of actively taking the perspective
of an out-group. This question is important because previous research indicates that one
effect of perspective taking is to negate or mitigate the impact of privately held
stereotypes on the evaluations of out-groups (Vescio, et al., 2003). If perspective taking
negates or mitigates the impact of negative stereotypes, then it is possible that people can
be motivated to help out-groups—even if they are threatening to the in-group.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The purpose of the present research is to examine what variables may lead
individuals to extend helping behaviors, both justice-related and non-justice-related, to
out-groups. Despite the fact that the review of the justice literature indicates that such
considerations and behaviors do not apply to out-groups, the empathy-helping behavior
literature suggests that actively taking the perspective of a target individual can lead to
evaluations and allocation behaviors that benefit that target individual’s group.
Perspective taking as an experimental manipulation has additional value in that it is able
to be operationalized at various levels. The research that has used perspective taking to
induce empathic concern for others has compared two levels of perspective-taking
instructions: instructions to remain objective to the plight of the target person (i.e.,
objective conditions), and instructions to consider the plight of the target person carefully
(i.e., individual empathy conditions). Across multiple studies and multiple contexts,
individuals in empathy conditions have been found to extend more helping behavior to
individuals in need than to individuals in objective conditions—and some of these
benefits have been successfully applied to the groups to which the targets belonged.
The first major aim of the current study will be to add two more levels to
perspective-taking instructions with an eye to further theory and understanding about outgroup justice behaviors. Previous research that has suggested that empathy-motivated
35
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helping is deactivated for out-groups has not manipulated empathy at the group level
(Stürmer, et al., 2006). The present research will attempt to address this weakness of the
literature by explicitly making the target of the perspective taking a group rather than an
individual. Group-level perspective taking will be operationalized in two different ways
that are relevant for a group-level analysis. First, ―out-group empathy‖ conditions will
use a set of perspective-taking instructions that ask participants to consider the plight of
the target group as a whole, leaving the explicit intergroup distinction intact. Second,
―superordinate empathy‖ conditions will use a set of perspective-taking instructions that
ask participants to consider the plight of the target group as a whole, but will include a
direct appeal to a superordinate level of identification with the perceiver. Differences in
levels of empathic concern that are indicated between these two new conditions should be
able to be interpreted as inter- versus intra-group experiences of empathy.
As indicated previously, the review of the group stereotypes literature suggests
that even if group perspective taking elicits empathy for the out-group, the level of
empathic concern may vary depending on specific stereotypes about the out-group. The
second major aim of the current study is to investigate this possibility directly by
integrating the group stereotype literature with the empathy-helping behavior literature.
Specifically, the current investigation will manipulate the two dimensions of the
stereotype content model, warmth and competence, to create four separate types of outgroups: warm and competent groups, cold and competent groups, warm and incompetent
groups, and cold and incompetent groups. To the extent that the four levels of
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perspective-taking instructions (i.e., individual objective, individual empathy, group
empathy, and superordinate empathy) interact with the dimensions of the stereotype
content model, the levels of perspective taking should have different implications for outgroup helping behavior depending on the type of out-group that is relevant.
Whereas research that has investigated helping behavior as the result of empathy
manipulations is vast, all of this research has operationalized helping in terms of either
help versus no help choices or in terms of differences in the extent to which individuals
report intentions to engage in a single helping behavior. That is, the existing literature
seems to treat helping behavior as a unitary construct (but see Cuddy, et al, 2007).
Helping behavior, however, should correspond to at least two dimensions. First, helping
behaviors should vary according to the extent to which they require effort on the part of
the helper. Second, helping behaviors should vary according to the extent to which they
require helpers to trust the individuals (or groups) they wish to help. A third aim of the
present research, therefore, is to create and utilize dependent measures of helping
behaviors that correspond to the dimensions of effort and trust. In addition, helping
behavior items reflecting a concern for procedural justice will be created and included as
a separate dependent measure for the main study.
A final goal of the present study will be to investigate the mediational process
through which perspective taking influences willingness to engage in helping behaviors.
It is likely that potential mediators of this relationship will vary among the different
empathy conditions. On one end of the levels of empathy, the results for individual
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empathy conditions should replicate those of previous research. That is, participants in
individual empathy conditions should experience empathic concern for the target outgroup member, and this concern should mediate the relationship between perspective
taking and helping behavior. The literature suggests that it is also possible that the extent
to which participants in individual empathy conditions experience a cognitive
overlapping of themselves with the target individual will also occur as a result of the
empathy manipulation. Thus, the potential for self-other overlap to mediate the
relationship between perspective taking and helping behavior will also be investigated.
On the other end of the levels of empathy, the nature of superordinate
identification is such that it emphasizes a common identity. Thus, individuals in
superordinate conditions should indicate that they are more likely to engage in helping
behaviors toward the out-group relative to those participants in the control conditions
(i.e., individual objective conditions), because the superordinate manipulation should
influence perceivers to view the targets as new members of their own in-group. If this is
indeed the case, then the relationship between perspective taking and helping behavior
for participants in superordinate conditions should be mediated by the extent to which
participants feel that they share a common identity with the relevant group. In contrast,
participants in out-group empathy conditions should not indicate particularly high levels
of a shared identity with the out-group, because the subgroup distinction should remain
intact. Instead, if perspective taking leads to increases in willingness to help in out-group
empathy conditions, this relationship might be mediated either by the extent to which
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participants experience empathic concern or the extent to which they experience a degree
of cognitive overlap with the target, or some combination of both processes.
The hypotheses for the superordinate and the out-group empathy conditions are
both speculative. Previous research from within the empathy-helping behavior literature
suggests that empathy is deactivated for out-groups (Stürmer, et al., 2006), and that
helping towards out-groups is predicted by interpersonal attraction rather than intergroup
empathy (Stürmer, et al., 2005). Thus, instructions to empathize with the out-group may
not lead to increased willingness to help the out-group. Moreover, even if such
instructions do lead to increases in out-group helping, such increases may not be
motivated by empathy. These potentials for null effects should be considered in light of
the fact that the research of Stürmer and his colleagues (2005, 2006) did not include
perspective-taking instructions as an experimental manipulation of empathic concern.
Thus, the present study will investigate the effects of four levels of perspective
taking and four different out-group stereotypes on empathic concern for the targets of the
perspective taking. In addition, the effects of empathic concern on participants’
willingness to engage in helping behaviors that vary according to effort and trust, as well
as their willingness to engage in specific justice-related helping behaviors will also be
investigated. Finally, if the above effects are found to be statistically significant, the
present study will attempt to identify process mechanisms for the observed empathyhelping relationships.

CHAPTER SIX
HYPOTHESES
Empathic Concern
The empathy literature indicates that careful consideration of the perspective of
another individual leads to empathic concern for that individual, which, in turn, motivates
helping behavior. In a first test of a group-level empathy hypothesis, it is hypothesized
that instructions to take the perspective of a group as a whole (defined either as an
explicit out-group or in terms of a superordinate level of identification) will lead to
empathic concern which, in turn, should motivate helping behavior.
Group Stereotypes
Assuming that the above hypothesis is supported by the data, it is further
hypothesized that the level of empathic concern experienced will depend on the specific
stereotypes that are associated with the out-group. Because this study represents the first
attempt to integrate the group stereotypes literature with the empathy-helping literature, it
is in some sense exploratory. However, there are expectations for some general patterns
of results. For example, groups associated with cold and incompetent stereotypes should
elicit less empathic concern from perceivers than groups associated with warm and
incompetent stereotypes.
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Perspective Taking
The main effect of group stereotypes is hypothesized to interact with the effect of
the perspective-taking manipulation. That is, the effects of group stereotypes on levels of
empathic concern may be different depending on the specific level of the perspectivetaking variable. Taking the perspective of a cold and incompetent out-group as a whole
may lead to less empathic concern and therefore less helping than would taking the
perspective of a single member of that out-group. Similarly, taking the perspective of a
cold and incompetent out-group as a whole may lead to less empathic concern than would
taking the perspective of such a group that is defined in terms of superordinate
identification with the perceiver’s own in-group. Yet another possibility of the
perspective-taking manipulation is that the empathy instructions (for individuals and
groups) may effectively wipe out any influence that group stereotypes have on empathic
concern. This possibility is suggested by previous research indicating that taking the
perspective of a target individual wiped out the effects of negative racial stereotypes on
evaluations of the target’s racial group (Vescio, et al., 2003).
Willingness to Help
Effort and Trust
It is hypothesized that increases in empathic concern, as a result of the empathy
perspective-taking conditions, will be associated with increased willingness to engage in
helping behaviors. However, the likelihood of helping out-groups is expected to be
moderated by the nature of the helping behavior itself. Helping behaviors that require
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minimal effort and/or trust, for example, may be more likely in general than are behaviors
that require maximum effort and/or trust on the part of the helper. The effect of effort and
trust may be further qualified by the effect of the stereotypes associated with the outgroup and the level of perspective-taking instructions. One manifestation of this threeway interaction would be if helping behaviors that require substantial effort and trust are
likely only for groups associated with warm and incompetent stereotypes that are also
defined in terms of superordinate identification with the perceiver’s in-group.
Justice
If individuals can be motivated via empathy to extend justice behaviors to outgroups, then empathy perspective-taking instructions should lead to increased willingness
to engage in justice-related helping behaviors compared with instructions to remain
objective. This is especially likely in the superordinate empathy conditions, as the justice
literature specifies that justice concerns are extended only to those who share a common
identity with the perceiver. The results of the analyses of the justice behaviors for the
group empathy conditions are of particular interest to the current investigation. If, as the
justice literature suggests, individuals do not consider out-groups in terms of justice, then
there should be no effect of the group empathy manipulation on willingness to engage in
justice-related helping behaviors. However, the empathy literature has already shown that
individuals can be influenced by empathy manipulations to allocate financial resources
(i.e., a distributive justice behavior) to out-groups. Because this research instructed
participants to consider the feelings of a single out-group member, however, it remains
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unclear whether the increase in allocation is a result of group-level empathy or an artifact
of the empathy felt for the single target member. If benefits for the out-group are due to
the empathy felt for the single target member, then such benefits should not be observed
in conditions which instruct participants to consider the feelings of the out-group as a
whole. However, if benefits for the out-group are at least partially related to group-level
empathy, then such benefits to out-groups in these conditions should remain intact.
It should be mentioned that the degree to which the empathy manipulations will
lead to helping and/or justice behavior will likely vary depending on the out-group
stereotype manipulation. Those groups that are seen as particularly vulnerable, for
example, may receive the greatest degree of benefit whereas those seen as cold and
competent may receive the least benefit, regardless of the empathy manipulation. These
possibilities have not been directly investigated in previous research, so they are
speculative until such time as the data can provide more solid conclusions.
Mediation
If perspective taking and group stereotypes interact to predict increases in
empathic concern, and if increases in empathic concern predict helping behavior, then the
mediational mechanism underlying such effects is likely to be different depending on
both the level of perspective-taking instructions (individual vs. out-group vs.
superordinate), as well as the stereotypes associated with the particular out-group (warmcompetent vs. warm-incompetent vs. cold-competent vs. cold-incompetent). Thus,
several tests of mediation will be conducted. The direct effect of perspective taking on
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helping for participants in superordinate empathy conditions is expected to be mediated
by group identification. For participants in individual and out-group empathy conditions,
the direct effect of perspective taking on helping is expected to be mediated by either
empathic concern, self-other overlap, or some combination of both. Assuming these
relationships are supported by the data, additional analyses will be conducted within each
of the perspective-taking conditions to see if the mediator of the relationship holds across
the four categories of out-group stereotypes.
Group Identification
The justice literature suggests that the likelihood that an individual will extend
justice-related helping behaviors (i.e., allocations, collective action against injustice) is
high only when the individual shares some level of category membership with a target.
Thus, the effects of group stereotypes and perspective taking on helping behaviors for
individuals in empathy conditions could be mediated by perceptions of group
identification as measured by group/self similarity and group attraction variables (Prislin,
Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). This is especially likely to be the case in superordinate
empathy perspective-taking conditions.
Self-Other Overlap
Whereas group identity refers to identification with a group as a whole, self-other
overlap refers to identification with a single individual. Thus, the effects of group
stereotypes and perspective taking on helping behaviors for participants in individual
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empathy conditions could be mediated by self-other overlap (Aron & Aron, 1986) as well
as empathic concern (see below).
Empathic Concern
The empathy-altruism literature suggests that extending helping behavior is likely
to the extent that an individual experiences empathic concern for the target. If so, then the
effects of group stereotypes and perspective taking could be mediated by empathic
concern instead of, or in addition to, self-other overlap. This pattern of results is expected
for out-group empathy conditions, even though previous literature suggests that empathy
is deactivated for out-groups. This pattern is also expected for individual empathy
conditions.

CHAPTER SEVEN
STUDY ONE
It is hypothesized that helping behaviors would correspond to at least two
dimensions: the extent to which they required effort on the part of the helper, and the
extent to which they required trust. Thus, the aim of study one was to generate two
Guttman scales of helping behavior: one for effortful helping behaviors and one for
helping behaviors that required trust. Twenty-two items were generated, six items
represented behaviors requiring low effort, five items represented behaviors requiring
high effort, five items represented behaviors requiring low levels of trust, and six items
represented behaviors requiring high levels of trust (Questionnaire A).
Method
Thirty undergraduate students (mean age = 22.43 years, SD = 6.78 years, 6 males)
were asked to fill out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Of the participants, 17 (56.7%)
identified themselves as Caucasian, 3 (10 %) identified themselves as African American
or Black, 4 (13.3%) identified themselves as Asian, 5 (16.7%) identified themselves as
Latino, and one participant (3.3%) indicated that he/she was from an ethnic background
that was not listed as an option.
Procedure
Participants read that the study was investigating people’s perceptions of the
degree to which various helpful behaviors towards out-group members required effort
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and trust. They were asked to read a scenario that described a particular group, and then
asked to evaluate various behaviors according to how much effort and trust they would
each require on a scale from 1 (none) to 9 (a great deal). Regarding effort, participants
read that ―effortful behaviors are those that require conscious and focused trying in
pursuit of a goal. In the current context, effortful behaviors are those that require time
and/or energy on the behalf of others.‖ Regarding trust, participants read that ―trusting
behaviors are those that rely on the character, ability, and truth of another. In the current
context, trust means that you would need to put faith in the character, ability, and truth of
members of this group before you would engage in the behaviors.‖
Participants then read a paragraph describing the ―Wallonians,‖ a description
adapted from Cuddy and colleagues (2007). The scenario read as follows:
Due to political and economic circumstances, United States demographers are
predicting waves of immigration in the next few years from an ethnic group
outside of our borders that call themselves the Wallonians. Imagine that you are
being asked to provide assistance to the Wallonians. Please read each of the
behaviors listed below, and indicate how much effort and trust you think each
behavior would require.
Following completion of the questionnaire, participants indicated their age,
gender, and ethnicity. They were then thanked for their participation, debriefed as to the
purpose of the study, and released.
Results
Ratings of effort required were indexed into a single measure of effort (α = .88),
and ratings of trust required were indexed into a single measure of trust (α = .91). A
correlational analysis indicated that effort and trust were separate, but related, constructs
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(r = .35, p = .06). Five items were selected for the effort scale based on the means and
standard deviations of the effort ratings (Questionnaire B, part I). The five items for the
effort scale were selected based on the relative magnitude of the mean effort required for
each behavior, such that the first item represented the lowest effort and was given a
weight of one and the last item represented the highest effort and was given a weight of
five. Likewise, five separate items were selected for the trust scale based on the means
and standard deviations of the trust ratings (Questionnaire B, part II). The five items for
the trust scale were selected based on the relative magnitude of the mean level of trust
required for each behavior such that the first item represented the least amount of trust
required and the last item required the most trust (Table 1).
Discussion
The purpose of the initial study was to demonstrate the utility of investigating
helping behaviors that correspond to differential levels of effort and required trust. As
was expected, results suggest that people are sensitive to different levels of effort and
trust that are required when deciding to help. Thus, behaviors that require less effort and
trust are likely to be observed more often than are behaviors that require maximum effort
and trust.
Main Study
Since the preliminary study suggested that people are sensitive to the extent to
which helping behaviors require effort and trust, the next logical question (and the main
question of this research) became clear: would individuals be willing to extend various
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levels of effort and trust to help different types of out-groups? Specifically, it was
hypothesized that out-groups that were described as socially cold and incompetent may
benefit from helping behaviors on the low ends of the effort and trust scales, but would
be less likely to benefit from behaviors that required maximum effort or trust. In contrast,
it was expected that out-groups that were described as socially warm and incompetent
would be more likely to benefit from helping behaviors that required a greater amount of
effort and trust on the part of the helper.
Method
Participants and Design
Three hundred and thirty-two undergraduates (123 men, M age = 19.0 years, age
range: 18-30 years) were recruited for the study and randomly assigned to conditions
among a 4(perspective taking: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group
empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence:
competent vs. incompetent) between subjects design. Of the participants, 218 (65.7%)
identified as Caucasian, nine (2.7%) identified as African American, 55 (16.6%)
identified as Asian, 27 (8.1%) identified as Latino, eight (2.4%) identified as Middle
Eastern, and 15 participants (4.5%) indicated that they identified with an ethnicity that
was not included among the options. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to
which they perceived their family to be immigrants to America on a 7-point scale from 1
(not at all) to 7 (very much), M = 4.15, SD = 2.32.
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Procedure
Participants arrived in the laboratory, and were asked to read and sign a consent to
participate in research. Participants were then told that the research was part of a larger
effort to get student input regarding American society’s reactions to groups of incoming
immigrants. Next, participants were told that United States demographers were predicting
waves of immigration in the next few years for an ethnic group that call themselves the
Wallonians. A brief description of the Wallonians followed which contained the
manipulation of out-group stereotypes (Cuddy et al., 2007). Specifically, participants in
warm-competent conditions read that Wallonians are viewed by their native country as
―competent, intelligent, socially warm, and good-natured.‖ Similarly, participants in
warm-incompetent, cold-competent, and cold-incompetent conditions read that
Wallonians are viewed by their native country as incompetent, unintelligent, socially
warm, and good-natured; competent, intelligent, socially cold, and ill-natured; or
incompetent, unintelligent, socially cold and ill-natured, respectively. After reading the
description, participants read that several hundred Wallonians had already arrived in the
United States, and that the purpose of the study was to assess student reactions to the
experiences that Wallonians have had so far.
Next, the perspective-taking manipulation took place. Specifically, participants
were instructed either to consider the experience of an individual Wallonian in the
described scenario objectively (i.e., individual objective conditions), to consider the
experience of an individual Wallonian carefully in terms of the impact that experience
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had on his or her feelings and how it affected his or her life (i.e., individual empathy
conditions), to consider the experience of a group of Wallonians as a whole carefully in
terms of the impact it had on their feelings and how it affected their lives (i.e., out-group
empathy conditions), or to consider the experience of a group of Wallonians as
representatives of new Americans carefully in terms of the impact it had on their feelings
and how it affected their lives (i.e., superordinate empathy conditions). Following this
manipulation, participants read the following scenario (which they were told had been
translated from the Wallonian’s native language) describing the experience of a group of
Wallonians:
My friends and I were traveling to see the sights downtown. We were not familiar
with Chicago’s bus and train system, and we ended up getting off the train a few
stops early. We decided to walk the remaining blocks to reach our destination, but
we became extremely lost. We could not make sense of the city maps we had,
because we were not familiar enough with English to understand many of the
terms. We were quickly overwhelmed by the noise and activity level of the city,
and we quickly became disoriented and confused. It was a very scary experience
for us. How will we ever adjust to life in this city?
Immediately following this procedure, participants were given five minutes to
describe the group they had read about and to write down any thoughts that they had in
response to reading about the scenario. This procedure was meant to encourage the
strengthening of the perspective-taking manipulation and the group-stereotype
manipulation. Following the thought listings, participants were asked to respond to a
series of questionnaires (see Questionnaires C-H in the Appendices) that measured the
dependent variables of interest as well as several demographic variables.
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Measures
Manipulation Checks
Participants’ open-ended responses to the two thought listings were analyzed for
content. Specifically, the responses were coded for the extent to which they reflected
objectivity or empathy towards the Wallonians, and the extent to which they mention the
stereotypes associated with the Wallonians.
Empathic Concern
Empathic concern was measured with the scale used by Batson and colleagues in
previous research (Batson, 1991, 1998; Batson, et al., 1986; Batson, et al., 2002; Batson,
et al., 2007). Participants indicated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely)
the extent to which they felt sympathetic, softhearted, compassionate, tender, and warm
after reading about the experience of the Wallonians. Reliability of the empathy scale was
assessed with the average inter-item correlation (r = .64), the average item total
correlation (r = .83), and Cohen’s alpha (α = .91). Responses to these items were
averaged into an index of empathic concern.
Personal Distress
Because some researchers in the prosocial literature suggest that personal distress,
rather than empathic concern, mediates the perspective-taking helping-behavior
relationship, this construct was also measured (Maner, et al., 2002). Participants indicated
on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely) the extent to which they felt alarmed,
troubled, distressed, upset, and disturbed after reading about the experience of the
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Wallonians. Reliability of the distress scale was assessed with the average inter-item
correlation (r = .66), the average item total correlation (r = .86), and Cohen’s alpha (α =
.91). Responses to these items were averaged into an index of distress.
Helping Behavior
Helping behavior was measured with the scales developed in study one.
Participants were asked to check the blanks that corresponded to behaviors that they
would be willing to engage in. The first five items were arranged in ascending order of
the degree of effort required to engage in the behavior. Specifically, participants indicated
if they would be willing to hold a door open for Wallonians carrying heavy loads, give
directions to Wallonians who were lost, invite Wallonians to a weekend barbeque at their
home, organize a benefit picnic in their community for Wallonians, and speak up if they
witnessed Wallonians being cheated by a shop keeper. For purposes of analysis, a total
effort score was computed by adding the number of behaviors participants indicated they
would engage in. The second five items were arranged in ascending order of the degree
of trust required to engage in the behavior. Specifically, participants indicated if they
were willing to read an informational flier describing the situation of Wallonians in
America, donate $5.00 to help Wallonians orient to the city, participate in a parade or
march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians, introduce Wallonians to their personal
friends, and offer to host Wallonians in their homes for a month. For purposes of
analysis, a total trust score was computed by adding the number of behaviors participants
indicated they would engage in.
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Procedural Justice-Helping Behaviors
For the justice-related behaviors, participants indicated on a 10-point scale (0 =
not at all and 9 = extremely) how willing they were to sign a petition in support of social
policies that protect the rights of Wallonians, campaign for legislation designed to protect
the rights of Wallonians, vote in support of policies designed to protect the rights of
Wallonians, volunteer their time to raise money for a town hall meeting where
Wallonians can express their concerns, support policies that take the perspective of
Wallonians into account, support community decisions that haven’t considered the voices
of the Wallonians (reverse scored), and support equal representation for Wallonians in
community decision-making. Reliability of the procedural justice scale was assessed with
the average inter-item correlation (r = .45), the average item total correlation (r = .73),
and Cohen’s alpha (α = .85). Responses to these items were averaged into an index of
procedural justice.
Group Identification
Two measures of group identification, group/self similarity and group attraction,
that have been used in several previous studies (Prislin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000; Prislin,
Brewer, & Wilson, 2002; Prislin & Christensen, 2005; Jacobs, Christensen, & Prislin,
2009) were adapted for use in the current investigation. Group/self similarity was
measured by items that assessed on a 10-point scale (0 = not at all and 9 = extremely) the
extent to which participants reported that the Wallonians were similar to them and to
people who were important to them. The reliability of the scale was assessed with
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Cohen’s alpha (α = .84); responses were averaged into an index of group/self similarity.
Group attraction was measured by items that assessed on a 10-point scale (0 = not at all
and 9 = extremely) the extent to which participants reported that they liked the
Wallonians, would like to socialize with the Wallonians, would like to take a class with
members of the Wallonians, would like to discuss other issues with the Wallonians, and
would like to work on a long-term project with the Wallonians. Reliability of the group
attraction was assessed with the average inter-item correlation (r = .66), the average item
total correlation (r = .86), and Cohen’s alpha (α = .88). Responses to these items were
averaged into an index of group attraction. Because group/self similarity and group
attraction proved to be significantly correlated, r = .58, p < .001, only group attraction
was chosen to be included in the main analyses as a measure of group identification.
Cognitive Overlap
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they perceived an
overlapping between their personal identity and the Wallonians, their personal identity
and Americans, and Americans and the Wallonians. Participants indicated each by
choosing among various figures that were adapted from previous research (Aron & Aron,
1986; Aron, et al., 1991). The figures display two circles; one circle represents the self
whereas the other circle represents the other (Questionnaire I). There are seven versions
of these figures within the measure, and the degree to which these circles overlap varies
between versions. Responses to the self-other overlap were scored such that the figure
representing zero self-other overlap was assigned a value of one and the figure
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representing almost total overlap was assigned a value of seven. This measure has been
used heavily in the past as an indication of the extent to which individuals experience
cognitive overlap between themselves and another (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, et al.,
1991).

CHAPTER EIGHT
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
To test the efficacy of the perspective-taking manipulation, the three empathy
conditions (i.e., individual, group, and superordinate) were aggregated into a single
category for purposes of analysis. Immediately following the description of the event
experienced by the Wallonians, participants were given an open-response question that
asked them to list thoughts that came to mind while they were reading the scenario. The
thought-listing task was meant to serve the dual purpose of reinforcing the perspectivetaking and group-stereotype manipulations as well to assess whether empathy and the
group stereotypes were mentioned. Participants’ responses were coded according to
whether or not empathy was mentioned. Specifically, two independent coders analyzed
the thought-listing task for whether stereotypes about social warmth and competence
were mentioned, as well as whether responses indicated that participants felt empathy for
the out-group. For all three variables (warmth, competence, and empathy), Cohen’s
Kappa coefficients indicated acceptable inter-rater reliability (Kappa = .74, .69, and .90,
respectively). A chi-square goodness of fit test indicated that whereas seven (8.5%)
participants in objective conditions mentioned empathy, 79 (31.6%) participants in
perspective-taking conditions mentioned empathy, a difference that is beyond chance
levels, χ2 (1) = 17.11, p < .001. In addition, mean empathy levels reported for participants
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in objective conditions (M = 4.16, SD = 1.36) were significantly lower than those of
participants in the perspective-taking conditions (M = 4.52, SD = 1.20) t(329) = -2.31, p =
.02. Taken together, these two analyses indicate that the empathy manipulation was
successful overall. Comparisons within the perspective-taking conditions, however, did
not indicate that there were different levels of empathy according to the level (i.e.,
individual, out-group, and superordinate) of perspective taking (all ps > .13).
To investigate the efficacy of group stereotypes about warmth, participant
responses to the open-response item were coded according to whether or not statements
about social warmth and coldness were mentioned. Inspection of these frequencies
indicated that 37 (11.1%) of participants mentioned social warmth or coldness in their
descriptions, indicating that the manipulation of group stereotypes about warmth was
weaker than expected. The main analyses that will be discussed below, however, indicate
some statistically significant effects of warmth stereotypes that suggest that these
variables were manipulated successfully. Similarly, to investigate the efficacy of group
stereotypes about competence, participant responses to the open-response item were
coded according to whether or not competence, incompetence, intelligence, and
ignorance were mentioned. Inspection of these frequencies indicated that 24 (7.2%)
participants mentioned competence or incompetence in their descriptions, indicating a
weaker manipulation than expected. As was the case for warmth stereotypes, however,
the main analyses reported below indicate significant effects for stereotypes about
competence that suggest that these variables were successfully manipulated.
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Correlations
Correlations among variables are listed in Table 2. Results indicate that perceived
overlap between participants and Wallonians significantly correlated with many of the
study variables. First, as participants perceived greater overlap between themselves and
Wallonians, they perceived greater overlap between Americans and Wallonians r = .48, p
< .001. However, whereas self-Wallonian overlap was associated with increases in
empathy for Wallonians (r = .29, p < .001), American-Wallonian overlap and selfAmerican overlap were not (rs = -.04 and -.10, ns, respectively). In addition, as
participants perceived greater degrees of overlap between themselves and Wallonians,
they indicated that they were more distressed (r = .14, p < .001), that they would exert
more effort (r = .28, p < .001) and trust (r = .32, p < .001) to help Wallonians, that they
were more willing to extend procedural justice considerations toward the Wallonians (r =
.37, p < .001), and identified more with the Wallonians as a group (r = .44, p < .001).
Perceptions of self-American overlap were negatively correlated with the extent to which
participants perceived themselves and their families to be immigrants, r = -.14, p < .001.
Inspection of a scatter plot of this relationship suggests that as perceptions of selfAmerican overlap increase, the perception of status as an immigrant decreases.
Finally, American-Wallonian overlap was significantly correlated with selfAmerican overlap (r = .28, p < .001), the effort and trust (both rs = .11, p < .05)
participants would put in helping Wallonians, and the level of identification with the
Wallonians (r = .15, p < .05).
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As participants’ perceptions of themselves and their families as immigrants to
America increased, so did empathy for the Wallonians (r = .29, p < .001), trust in the
Wallonians (r = .15, p < .001), willingness to extend procedural justice considerations
toward the Wallonians (r = .25, p < .001), and identification with the Wallonians as a
group (r = .21, p < .001).
Empathy was found to be significantly related to many of the study variables in
addition to the overlap measure mentioned above. Specifically, as participants’ level of
empathy for the Wallonians increased, so did their levels of distress (r = .25, p < .001),
the effort (r = .35, p < .001) and trust (r = .43, p < .001) they would put into helping
Wallonians, their willingness to extend procedural justice considerations to the
Wallonians (r = .52, p < .001), and their level of identification with the Wallonians as a
group (r = .50, p < .001). In addition, as participants indicated more distress, they were
more likely to extend procedural justice considerations to the Wallonians, r = .15, p <
.001.
The amount of effort participants were willing to expend in order to help
Wallonians was also positively correlated to the amount of trust they were willing to
place in the Wallonians (r = .59, p < .001), their reported willingness to extend
procedural justice considerations to Wallonians (r = .46, p < .001), as well as with the
level of identification with the Wallonians (r = .43, p < .001). The amount of trust
participants were willing to place in the Wallonians was also positively correlated with
willingness to extend procedural justice considerations (r = .60, p < .001) as well as
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identification with the Wallonians (r = .50, p < .001). Finally, willingness to extend
procedural justice considerations to Wallonians was positively associated with the extent
to which participants identified with Wallonians as a group, r = .67, p < .001.
Personal Distress
Responses to the personal distress index were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking
instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs.
superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs.
incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the
distress score as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 3. Results
indicated a significant perspective-taking X competence interaction effect on responses to
the distress index F(3, 316) = 2.77, p = .042. Subsequent simple effects tests within
competence conditions revealed a main effect of perspective taking F(3, 166) = 4.59, p =
.004. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference (HSD)
procedure indicated that when out-groups were described as competent, those in outgroup perspective-taking conditions (M = 3.05) and superordinate perspective-taking
conditions (M = 3.0) experienced significantly more distress than participants in objective
conditions (M = 2.10), t(83) = 3.28, p = .007 and t(83) = 3.10, p = .012, respectively. In
addition, when out-groups were described as competent, there was a trend for those in
individual empathy conditions to experience more distress than participants in objective
conditions, t(82) = -2.50, p = .063 (see Figure 1). Participants that read about incompetent
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groups experienced similar levels of distress across levels of perspective taking F(3, 158)
= .95, ns.
Because research has suggested that personal distress, rather than empathic
concern, mediates the perspective-taking / helping-behavior relationship, the effect of
personal distress on willingness to engage in helping behaviors was assessed with
regression analyses. Results indicated that distress did not predict willingness to engage
in effortful helping behaviors (B = .05, SE = .04, p = .144). In contrast, distress did
significantly predict willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required trust (B =
.13, SE = .05, p = .007). This latter result indicates that increases in personal distress are
associated with increases in the willingness to trust an out-group. Thus, subsequent
analyses that will investigate the effect of the empathy manipulation on intentions to
engage in helping that requires trust will be statistically controlled for the influence of
personal distress.
Empathic Concern
Responses to the empathy index were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking
instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs.
superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs.
incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the
empathy as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 4. Results indicated a
marginally significant effect of perspective-taking conditions F(3, 315) = 2.56, p = .055.
Because there was a specific interest in the effect of the different levels of the

63
perspective-taking manipulation, Dunnett’s test was used as a post-hoc procedure that
compared responses of participants in each of the three empathy perspective-taking
conditions with responses of participants in objective conditions. The results of the
Dunnett’s test indicated that participants in superordinate empathy conditions (M = 4.70,
SD = 1.12) reported significantly higher levels of empathy than participants in objective
conditions (M = 4.16, SD = 1.36), t(163) = 2.76, p = .017. No other effects were
significant in this analysis.
Helping Behavior
The effects of the independent variables on three separate types of helping
behaviors (those requiring effort, those requiring trust, and those that were justice related)
were investigated.
Behaviors Requiring Effort
Responses to the effortful helping scale were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking
instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs.
superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs.
incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the
effortful helping score as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 5. A
main effect of competence indicated that participants were more likely to expend effort to
help competent groups (M = 3.52, SD = .92) than they were to help incompetent groups
(M = 3.31, SD = .93), F(1, 316) = 4.22, p = .041.
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This effect of competence was qualified by a significant perspective taking X
warmth X competence interaction, F(3, 316) = 2.65, p = .049. Simple effects tests within
warmth conditions revealed a competence X perspective-taking interaction effect only
within cold conditions, F(1, 316) = 3.12, p = .03. Subsequent decomposition of this effect
revealed that there was no effect of perspective-taking instructions on the level of effort
participants were willing to expend for cold and competent groups F(3, 316) = 1.24, p =
.31. For cold and incompetent groups, however, the results of a Dunnett’s test indicated
that participants in objective conditions (M = 3.65, SD = .99) showed significantly more
willingness to put effort into helping than did individuals in out-group empathy
conditions (M = 2.95, SD = 1.0), t(316) = -2.38, p = .052 (see Figure 2).
Behaviors Requiring Trust
Responses to the trustful helping scale were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking
instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs.
superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs.
incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with personal distress added as a
covariate. Means and standard deviations of the trustful helping score as a function of
experimental condition are listed in Table 6. Inspection of the results revealed only one
marginally significant finding. Specifically, there was a trend for participants to be more
likely to engage in behaviors requiring trust for groups described as competent (M = 2.78,
SD = 1.19) than as incompetent (M = 2.56, SD = 1.26), F(1, 316) = 2.71, p = .10.
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Justice-Related Behaviors
Responses to the procedural justice-helping behaviors were subjected to a
4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. outgroup empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence:
competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard
deviations of the procedural justice score as a function of experimental condition are
listed in Table 7. Results indicated no effect of either of the independent variables on the
procedural justice index.
Group Identification
Responses to the measure of group identification were subjected to a
4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. outgroup empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence:
competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard
deviations of the procedural justice score as a function of experimental condition are
listed in Table 8. Results indicated a main effect of warmth such that participants
identified significantly more with groups that were described as warm (M = 6.14, SD =
1.35) than with those described as cold (M = 5.82, SD = 1.58), F(1, 316) = 4.06, p = .045.
No other effect was significant in this analysis.
Cognitive Overlap
Responses to all three measures of self-other overlap were subjected to
4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-
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group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence:
competence vs. incompetence) analyses of variance (ANOVA).
Self-Wallonian Overlap
Means and standard deviations of perceptions of cognitive overlap between the
participants and the Wallonians are listed in Table 9. Results indicated a main effect of
warmth such that participants perceived significantly more cognitive overlap between
themselves and warm groups (M = 3.38, SD = 1.42) than they did between themselves
and cold groups (M = 3.09, SD = 1.42), F(1, 316) = 3.78, p = .053. In addition, there was
a main effect of competence such that participants perceived significantly more cognitive
overlap between themselves and competent groups (M = 3.44, SD = 1.43) than they did
between themselves and incompetent groups (M = 3.01, SD = 1.42), F(1, 316) = 7.80, p =
.006. No other effects were statistically significant in these analyses.
Self-American Overlap
Means and standard deviations of perceptions of cognitive overlap between the
participants and Americans are listed in Table 10. Results indicated no effect of the
independent variables on perceptions of cognitive overlap between participants and
Americans.
American-Wallonian Overlap
Means and standard deviations of participants’ perceptions of cognitive overlap
between Americans and Wallonians are listed in Table 11. Results indicated a marginal
effect of perspective taking such that participants who were instructed to empathize with
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the Wallonians as a group indicated slightly weaker perceptions of American-Wallonian
overlap (M = 2.64, SD = 1.27) than did participants who were instructed to be objective
(M = 3.10, SD = 1.45), t(316) = -2.05, p = .10. Results also indicated a main effect of
competence such that participants who believed that the Wallonians were competent
indicated significantly higher perceptions of American-Wallonian overlap (M = 3.14, SD
= 1.45) than did participants who believed that the Wallonians were incompetent (M =
2.83, SD = 1.42), F(1, 316) = 3.84, p = .051. No other effects were statistically significant
in these analyses.
Empathic Concern and Helping Behavior Relationship
Two separate regression equations investigated the direct effect of empathic
concern on willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required effort and trust,
respectively. With regard to effort, analysis indicated that increases in empathic concern
were significantly related to increases in willingness to extend helping behaviors that
required effort, (B = .245, SE = .038) t(329) = 6.66, p < .001. Analysis also indicated that,
controlling for personal distress, increases in empathic concern were significantly related
to increases in willingness to extend helping behaviors that required trust, (B = .419, SE =
.049) t(329) = 8.55, p < .001. To investigate the nature of these effects, mediation
analyses were conducted (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998; MacKinnon, 1994).
Mediation
The previous analysis of the effects of the independent variables on willingness to
engage in helping behaviors that required effort revealed a perspective taking X warmth
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X competence interaction effect. The decomposition of this effect by subsequent analyses
indicated that it was the cold and incompetent out-groups in which there was a main
effect of the perspective-taking manipulation. More specifically, for out-groups that were
described as cold and incompetent, instructions to take the perspective of the out-group as
a whole resulted in significantly less willingness to help than instructions to remain
objective. Thus, for only those participants who read about socially cold and incompetent
groups, three potential mediators of this effect (empathic concern, self-other overlap, and
group identification) were investigated with the use of multiple regression analyses.
Three dummy variables were created to represent the comparisons between the
objective conditions and the three empathy conditions that were then entered into a
regression equation predicting willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required
trust. This analysis indicated that compared with instructions to remain objective,
instructions to take the perspective of the out-group as a whole resulted in significant
decreases in willingness to help (B = -.70, SE = .294) t(76) = -2.38, p = .02. To
investigate whether empathic concern mediated the effect of perspective taking on
helping, a second regression equation was created. These results revealed that taking the
perspective of a cold and incompetent out-group as a whole resulted in a non-significant
decrease in empathic concern (B = -.576, SE = .39), t(75) = -1. 48, p = .14. Thus, the
second criterion for establishing mediation via empathic concern was not satisfied in
these analyses. Analysis proceeded by investigating whether the direct effect of
perspective taking on effortful helpful behaviors (for participants in cold and incompetent
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conditions) was mediated by perceptions of self-other overlap or by perceptions of group
identification. In both cases, the second criterion for mediation (i.e., that perspective
taking influenced the mediator) was not established (B = -.50, SE = .47) t(76) = -1.06, p =
.30 and (B = -.46, SE = .55) t(76) = -0.84, p = .40, respectively.
The previous analyses of the effects of the independent variables on willingness to
engage in helping behaviors that required trust revealed no statistically significant effects.
Thus, potential mediators of the perspective-taking / helping-behavior relationship were
not investigated further.

CHAPTER NINE
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Knowledge of what types of groups are likely to receive help from other
individuals, and under what conditions such help is motivated by empathic concern
versus group identification versus self-other overlap is important for both the theoretical
and applied social-psychological arenas. Most basically, the value of the research
described here is that it represents a first step at integrating three separate areas of
inquiry: social justice, prosocial behavior, and group stereotypes.
A main purpose of the study was to see whether or not empathy could be elicited
toward out-groups via a perspective-taking manipulation that instructed participants to
take the perspective of an out-group as a whole. Results for these analyses revealed two
noteworthy findings. First and foremost, this study failed to replicate the well-established
finding that taking the perspective of an individual in need leads to increases in empathic
concern compared with instructions to remain objective.
That is, there was not a significant difference in levels of empathic concern
between objective conditions and conditions which instructed participants to empathize
with the individual describing the stressful event. It is a well-established finding in the
empathy literature that empathy is deactivated for out-groups, but the individual empathy
perspective-taking instructions asked participants to ―consider how the author of the
description felt and how it affected his or her life.‖ These words were taken, verbatim,
from previous research that has consistently found higher levels of empathy in
70
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perspective-taking conditions relative to objective conditions (Batson, 1991, 1998;
Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson, Bolen, Cross, &
Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Batson, Dyck, Brandt, Batson, Powell, McMaster, & Griffitt,
1988). What was it about the current study’s procedures that may have led to a nonsignificant difference between individual empathy and objective conditions?
One element of this study that has differed from research on the empathy-helping
behavior relationship is that even though the instructions to participants in individual
empathy conditions were to focus on the individual, the target person was described,
explicitly, as a member of an out-group. There has been at least one previous study,
however, that has demonstrated that taking the perspective of a stigmatized out-group
member results in empathic concern for that individual (Batson, et al., 2002). Batson’s
study, however, focused on an out-group (convicted heroin dealers) that was stigmatized
according to the norms and values of the participant’s own society. Because convicted
heroin dealers are stigmatized sub-groups within a larger group (i.e., citizens of the
United States), they are not the same kind of out-groups as are the out-groups in the
current investigation (recent immigrants from another country). Thus, in the context of
the empathy-helping behavior relationship, it could be the case that there are varying
levels of distance from one’s own in-group by which out-groups can be conceptualized. If
so, then it is a strong possibility that the value of perspective taking in eliciting empathy
for representatives of out-groups will be sensitive to this level of distance between the
perceiver and the out-group. Whereas the convicted heroin dealers in Batson’s research
(Batson, et al., 2002) may have been conceptualized as a proximal out-group, the out-
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groups in the current investigation (recent immigrants from another country) may have
been conceptualized as distal out-groups. Thus, the fact that the present study failed to
replicate the well-documented finding that taking the perspective of an individual leads to
increases in empathy for that individual may be because the individual in the current
context was a member of a distal out-group. Future research will investigate this
possibility further.
Another possibility is the description of the actual event in the scenario. The
current study differed from previous investigations of these phenomena because the
description was of an event experienced by a group rather than by an individual. Thus,
although the description was recounted by an individual, and although participants were
instructed to consider the perspective of that individual while reading the description, the
description itself referred to a group-level experience and not an individual one.
The second noteworthy conclusion with regard to the empathy findings is
interesting especially because of the immediately previous discussion about the
deactivation of empathy for out-groups. Specifically, results indicated that the only
perspective-taking condition that resulted in significantly higher levels of empathic
concern than the objective condition was the one that explicitly instructed participants to
think of the experience of the out-group from a perspective that stressed a superordinate
level of identification. Once participants were interpreting the description of the grouplevel event from a perspective that stressed an overarching identification with the outgroup, significantly higher levels of empathy were reported compared with those found in
objective conditions. The lack of effects for the out-group perspective-taking condition
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may be because considering how an out-group feels is very difficult for people to do
cognitively. That is, participants may not have the cognitive capacity to empathize with
anything other than an individual. Thus, empathizing with a group may simply not
register as a conceivable option for participants. Overall, the results of the first test of the
group-level empathy hypothesis suggest two possibilities. First, empathizing with an outgroup may require cognitive mechanisms that are different from those required to
empathize with an individual, and therefore may require different instructions. The
second possibility is that the mere suggestion of an out-group may deactivate empathic
concern unless a specific appeal to an overarching identification with the out-group is
made. Put differently, only when ―they‖ become ―us‖—or come closer to becoming
―us‖—is empathy activated.
A second major goal of the current study was to assess if the magnitude of
empathy toward out-groups depended on specific stereotypes associated with those outgroups. The stereotype content model (Fiske, et al., 2002; Fiske, 2004; Cuddy, et al.,
2007) has been used in the past to predict willingness to engage in helping behaviors
towards groups, but had not been used in conjunction with empathy manipulations until
the current investigation. The model, standing on its own, suggests that two variables
influence willingness to engage in helping behavior: the extent to which groups are
perceived as warm and the extent to which they are perceived as competent. The value of
an integration of this literature with the empathy literature is in the fact that competence
and warmth, as out-group stereotypes, are likely to affect the magnitude of empathic
concern felt for groups. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants would feel
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more empathy for out-groups that were described as socially warm and competent than
they would for out-groups that were described as socially cold and incompetent.
In terms of theoretical contribution to the research of the empathy-helping
behavior relationship, the major implications of this research are to suggest, first, that
empathy manipulations do not result in differences in helping behavior toward out-groups
per se. Rather, the results of this study suggest that the empathy manipulations affect
willingness to engage in helping behaviors that require effort but not those that require
trust. The second theoretical implication of this research is the finding that, indeed, the
effects of perspective taking on willingness to engage in helping behaviors that require
effort depend on the specific stereotypes that are associated with the out-group. The
nature of this finding, however, is much different than was expected.
At a general level, it was hypothesized that without an empathy manipulation (i.e.,
in objective conditions), participants would be less likely to help groups that had
undesirable characteristics (i.e., social coldness and incompetence). Further, it was
hypothesized that instructions to empathize with groups described as socially cold and
incompetent would lead to increases in helping behavior. Results indicated exactly the
opposite. Specifically, participants who were instructed to empathize with socially cold
and incompetent groups as a whole indicated significantly less willingness to engage in
effortful helping behaviors compared with participants who were instructed to be
objective. Although unexpected and counterintuitive, these findings suggest the
possibility that thoughtful consideration of the perspective of a group that is socially cold
and incompetent may lead to negative feelings that result in less helping. Even if
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participants in objective conditions had these same negative feelings in response to
reading about such groups, the instructions to be objective may have helped them to
ignore the influence of those feelings when making decisions about helping.
Another explanation converges with recent research suggesting situations in
which perspective taking is likely to backfire. For example, a field experiment that was
conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (an area replete with intergroup conflict)
investigated the effects of perspective taking on attitudes toward naturally occurring outgroups. Results indicated that people who were exposed to the perspectives of out-groups
indicated less tolerance of the out-group and were less likely to help them than if they had
not been exposed to their perspectives (Paluck, 2010).
Integrating the justice literature into this discussion is of value because resource
allocation to out-groups (a distributive justice behavior) is, in fact, a helping behavior
directed toward out-groups. As such, it was hypothesized that justice-related helping
behaviors may also be sensitive to empathy and group-stereotype manipulations.
Standing on its own, the justice literature suggests that in order for people to extend
justice considerations to out-groups, there is a need to establish some sort of overarching
common identity. Researchers studying prosocial behavior, however, have demonstrated
that individuals can be motivated by empathic concern for an individual out-group
member to allocate money (a distributive justice behavior) to that individual’s group. The
research presented here attempted to extend those findings to the realm of procedural
justice. On a purely descriptive level, it is interesting to note, first, that the correlation
between empathy and willingness to extend procedural justice considerations to out-
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groups was significant and positive, indicating that increases in empathy are associated
with an increase in the inclusion of out-groups into procedural justice reasoning (see
Table 2). Second, the prevailing wisdom from within the social justice literature is that
justice considerations apply only to individuals who share a common identity with the
perceiver. If this were indeed the case, then one would expect participants in
superordinate empathy conditions (who experienced a deliberate appeal to a common
identification with the out-group) to be the only group to indicate strong willingness to
include extend procedural justice reasoning to out-groups. Inspection of Table 7,
however, indicates mean values above the scale’s mid-point across experimental
conditions, suggesting that participants in this study were relatively willing to extend
procedural justice considerations to groups as a whole, even without an appeal to
superordinate identification.
Perhaps because of the relatively high mean values of the procedural justice
variable across experimental conditions, results of the inferential analyses suggest that
neither perspective taking nor group-stereotype manipulations affected the degree to
which participants were willing to extend procedural justice considerations to out-groups.
The pattern of means offers suggestive evidence, however, of the benefits of
superordinate identification in some circumstances. Specifically, the rank order of the
magnitude of the means across warmth conditions indicates that the value of
superordinate identification may be the most pronounced when groups are described as
socially cold. That is, only when groups are described as cold are the means for the
superordinate perspective-taking conditions the highest of the four perspective-taking
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levels. That said, these differences were not statistically significant. Because evidence
suggests that the group-stereotype manipulations for the warmth and competence
dimensions were weaker than expected, a conclusion that these variables don’t affect
procedural justice concerns may be too hasty. It remains an interesting question for future
research to investigate if a stronger (and conceptually cleaner) manipulation of group
stereotypes will impact willingness to extend justice considerations to out-groups.
The competence dimension, in particular, should be of interest in future studies
for a variety of reasons. First, although participants indicated significantly more personal
distress after reading about groups that were described as incompetent, only participants
who read about competent groups were significantly more willing to engage in helping
behaviors requiring effort (and also those requiring trust, though this effect was only
marginally significant). Second, two of the three measures of cognitive overlap (selfWallonian overlap and Wallonian-American overlap) had main effects for competence
such that ratings of these measures were significantly higher for participants who read
about competent groups compared to incompetent groups. These findings suggest that
whereas participants are more distressed when reading about a stressful experience that
was had by an incompetent out-group, they are only more likely to extend effortful
helping behaviors toward out-groups that they believe to be competent. Thus, the results
of this study suggest that helping of out-groups is not associated with increased levels of
personal distress.
Interestingly, there was no main effect of competence for the group identification
measure. To the extent that participants experienced increases in perceptions of cognitive
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overlap between themselves and Wallonians and between Americans and Wallonians as
the result of the competence manipulation, it seems reasonable to expect similar effects of
competence on the group identification variable, as group identification and self-other
overlap are related constructs. Instead, however, there was a main effect of the warmth
dimension on mean levels of group identification such that participants who read about
socially warm groups reported significantly higher levels of identification with the outgroup than did those who read about socially cold groups. Importantly, the questions that
made up the group identification measure were those such as ―How much do you like this
group?‖, and ―How much would you like to spend time with this group in the future?‖ It
may be the case, therefore, that whereas the competence stereotype influences cognitive
dimensions of affiliation with others (i.e., self-other overlap), stereotypes about warmth
influence the affective dimension of affiliation with others.
In terms of applied significance, the results reported here suggest that groups
associated with certain characteristics (i.e., competence and intelligence) are more likely
to receive help from others than groups associated with other characteristics (i.e.,
incompetence and ignorance). Thus, focused efforts should be made to highlight the
competence and intelligence of out-groups that are in need of help. The results reported
here also suggest that efforts to help out-groups that are perceived as socially cold should
not attempt to elicit empathy to motivate helping behavior. Indeed, the results of the
present study suggest that appeals to empathy for such groups actually decrease
willingness to help. Efforts in these situations may be better spent trying to focus on the
extent to which out-groups who are socially cold are intelligent and competent. Finally, if
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it is simply not possible to mitigate the impact of stereotypes about the social coldness of
out-groups, the research presented here suggests that instilling an overarching
identification with socially cold out-groups may be necessary in order to elicit empathic
concern toward them. In sum, these results suggest that if the goal is to increase helping
behavior toward out-groups, then specific strategies should be employed that either
eliminate or reduce the impact of stereotypes about incompetence, ignorance, and social
coldness on individuals’ willingness to help others.
Limitations
The biggest limitation of the study is that since the Wallonians are a fictional
group unknown to most people, participants did not have access to any information about
them other than what was given in the description. Obviously, real-world out-groups are
nested within a shared social context that this study did not represent, so future research
should attempt to investigate the relationships suggested here using real-life out-groups.
That said, one of the main purposes of the current study was to assess the effects of group
stereotypes on willingness to help out-groups; thus, the benefit of the current study is that
the content of those stereotypes was experimentally controlled. Control over the content
of stereotypes about real out-groups would either be impossible or extremely difficult,
and this could lead to multiple confounds about the inferences drawn about the effects of
stereotypes on helping.
Another limitation to the study is suggested by the inspection of the responses to
the thought-listing task that followed the manipulation of group stereotypes. Specifically,
very few participants mentioned anything about social warmth or coldness or competence
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or incompetence. Of those that did mention these things, the majority of responses
indicated that the description of the event experienced by the Wallonians who were lost
in the city seemed to contradict the description of the group that was provided. For
example, participants seemed confused that a group that was supposed to be competent
and intelligent would not think to ask for directions if they were lost in the city.
More problematic is the fact that 44% of the sample mentioned the language
barrier in their thought listings, even though a language barrier was not included in the
theorizing about this project. As part of the scenario, a statement was included that the
description participants were going to read about a recent immigrant group had been
―translated from the group’s native language.‖ This statement was meant to strengthen
the perception of the Wallonians as an out-group; however, this statement introduced a
significant amount of ―noise‖ to the validity of assumptions regarding the effects of
competence and warmth. The majority of participants who mentioned the language
barrier in their thought listings argued one of two things. First, participants indicated that
an inability to understand a foreign language is not and should not be perceived as
ignorance or incompetence. Second, many participants expressed anger and frustration at
the Wallonians that they would come to the country without knowledge of the English
language. Moreover, many participants expressed particular surprise that groups
described as intelligent and competent would be in a situation that would require
language competence if they did not know the language.
The thought listings, therefore, suggest at least two intractable confounds to the
current research. First, some participants seemed to be disregarding information about
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incompetence by focusing on the fact that a language barrier can sometimes masquerade
as ignorance or incompetence. Second, some participants were using information about
the language barrier to disconfirm stereotypes about competence. In retrospect, the
sentence about the translation was a mistake, and future research will either not mention
the language barrier or will explicitly state that the out-groups in question are familiar
with the English language.
Regarding the procedural justice findings, one limitation is the ad-hoc nature of
the measure of procedural justice-related helping behaviors. The scale was developed and
piloted in the current study, and although initial psychometric evidence suggests that the
scale is reliable, there is no validity evidence for the scale as of yet. The items of the scale
were developed from within the framework of procedural justice theory: all items
reflected questions revolving around the extent to which participants believed that the
voices of the Wallonians should be heard in American decision-making processes. In this
regard, the scale has a high degree of face validity. It remains a task of future research,
however, to establish the validity of this scale further.
As a final point, the effort to integrate the social-psychological literatures of
social justice, the empathy-helping behavior relationship, and group stereotypes is going
to require multiple studies across multiple contexts. As a first investigation, the current
study, rather than establishing when perspective taking is useful across different types of
groups, has instead established when such perspective taking backfires. Thus,
interventions to promote empathy with ingroup members may not be appropriate, and
may even be detrimental, when used in conjunction with outgroup members.

APPENDIX A:
TABLES
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of effort and trust ratings of helping behaviors

Effort

Trust

Behavior
Hold doors open for Wallonians carrying heavy loads.
Offer to give directions to lost Wallonians.
Invite Wallonians to a weekend barbeque at your home.
Speak up if you see a merchant cheat a Wallonian.
Organize a benefit picnic for Wallonians in your community
Read an informational flier describing the situation of Wallonians in
America.
Donate $5.00 to help Wallonians adapt to the city.
Participate in a march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians.
Introduce Wallonians to your personal friends.
Host Wallonians in your home for a month.

M
1.97
3.03
4.10
5.52
6.55
3.28

SD
2.72
2.67
2.56
2.87
2.25
3.06

4.58
5.59
6.76
8.31

3.0
2.41
2.37
1.49
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Table 2. Correlations among variables

Variable
1. Self-Wallonian overlap
2. Self-American overlap
3. American-Wallonian overlap
4. Age
5. Immigration status
6. Empathy
7. Distress
8. Total effort
9. Total trust
10. Procedural justice
11. Group identification

1

2

3

4

5

6

1.0

.03

.48**

.06

.09

.29**

1.0

.28**

-.12*

-.14**

1.0

.01
1.0

7

8

9

10

11

.14** .28**

.32**

.37**

.44**

-.10

.03

-.06

-.03

-.09

-.06

-.10

-.04

-.03

.11*

.11*

.10

.15**

.01

.10

.01

.04

-.04

.03

.08

1.0

.29**

.10

.09

.15**

.25**

.21**

1.0

.25** .35**

.43**

.52**

.50**

1.0

.08

.15**

.10

.09

1.0

.59**

.46**

.43**

1.0

.60**

.50**

1.0

.67**
1.0

* p < .05, ** p < .001
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of distress as a function of experimental
condition

Warmth
Warm

Cold

Competence

Competence

Competent

Incompetent

Competent

Incompetent

Perspective-taking
condition
Objective

2.08 (1.13)

2.56 (1.38)

2.13 (1.03)

3.09 (1.58)

Individual empathy

2.95 (1.58)

2.62 (1.39)

2.72 (1.16)

2.69 (1.46)

Group empathy

2.95 (1.51)

3.11 (1.37)

3.14 (1.65)

2.93 (1.56)

Superordinate
empathy

2.79 (1.67)

2.40 (1.15)

3.19 (1.31)

2.65 (1.46)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses
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Table 4. Means and standard deviations of empathy as a function of experimental
condition

Warmth
Warm

Cold

Competence

Competence

Competent

Incompetent

Competent

Incompetent

Perspective-taking
condition
Objective

4.17 (1.74)

4.03 (1.30)

4.07 (1.30)

4.39 (1.06)

Individual empathy

4.49 (1.33)

4.50 (0.91)

4.17 (1.09)

4.47 (1.04)

Group empathy

4.71 (1.25)

4.43 (1.31)

4.89 (1.27)

3.82 (1.50)

Superordinate
empathy

4.58 (1.26)

4.67 (0.90)

4.73 (1.13)

4.81 (1.23)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses
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Table 5. Means and standard deviations of effortful helping as a function of experimental
condition

Warmth
Warm

Cold

Competence

Competence

Competent

Incompetent

Competent

Incompetent

Perspective-taking
condition
Objective

3.52 (0.87)

3.10 (0.79)

3.19 (0.99)

3.65 (0.99)

Individual empathy

3.50 (0.76)

3.57 (1.03)

3.55 (1.06)

3.15 (0.75)

Group empathy

3.62 (0.92)

3.33 (1.02)

3.68 (0.84)

2.95 (1.0)

Superordinate
empathy

3.48 (1.08)

3.50 (0.76)

3.64 (0.85)

3.25 (0.97)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Table 6. Means and standard deviations of trustful helping as a function of experimental
condition

Warmth
Warm

Cold

Competence

Competence

Competent

Incompetent

Competent

Incompetent

Perspective-taking
condition
Objective

2.62 (1.24)

2.50 (1.40)

2.29 (1.31)

2.70 (1.17)

Individual empathy

2.95 (1.19)

2.76 (0.94)

3.09 (1.15)

2.45 (1.36)

Group empathy

3.05 (1.12)

2.71 (1.19)

2.64 (0.95)

2.15 (1.42)

Superordinate
empathy

2.67 (1.11)

2.65 (1.27)

2.95 (1.36)

2.55 (1.36)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Table 7. Means and standard deviations of procedural justice behaviors as a function of
experimental condition

Warmth
Warm

Cold

Competence

Competence

Competent

Incompetent

Competent

Incompetent

Perspective-taking
condition
Objective

5.99 (1.39)

5.38 (1.51)

5.36 (1.35)

5.74 (1.45)

Individual empathy

5.33 (1.92)

5.68 (1.08)

5.80 (1.43)

5.51 (1.45)

Group empathy

5.84 (0.95)

5.90 (1.54)

5.64 (1.60)

4.89 (1.91

Superordinate
empathy

5.82 (1.55)

5.84 (0.98)

6.16 (1.47)

5.93 (1.42)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Table 8. Means and standard deviations of group identification as a function of
experimental condition

Warmth
Warm

Cold

Competence

Competence

Competent

Incompetent

Competent

Incompetent

Perspective-taking
condition
Objective

6.26 (1.43)

5.98 (1.31)

5.60 (1.30)

5.84 (1.74)

Individual empathy

6.00 (1.63)

1.67 (1.02)

5.83 (1.76)

5.43 (1.54)

Group empathy

6.26 (1.23)

5.79 (1.63)

6.03 (1.39)

5.38 (2.04)

Superordinate
empathy

6.76 (1.23)

5.90 (1.16)

6.05 (1.23)

6.36 (1.57)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Table 9. Means and standard deviations of self-Wallonian overlap as a function of
experimental condition

Warmth
Warm

Cold

Competence

Competence

Competent

Incompetent

Competent

Incompetent

Perspective-taking
condition
Objective

3.76 (1.48)

3.00 (1.21)

2.71 (1.35)

3.05 (1.43)

Individual empathy

3.90 (1.71)

3.19 (1.47)

3.00 (1.35)

2.85 (1.60)

Group empathy

3.33 (1.23)

3.33 (1.23)

3.27 (1.35)

2.55 (1.36)

Superordinate
empathy

3.67 (1.56)

2.85 (1.27)

3.91 (1.06)

3.30 (1.59)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Table 10. Means and standard deviations of self-American overlap as a function of
experimental condition

Warmth
Warm

Cold

Competence

Competence

Competent

Incompetent

Competent

Incompetent

Perspective-taking
condition
Objective

4.71 (1.42)

4.85 (1.63)

4.71 (1.87)

5.00 (1.62)

Individual empathy

4.90 (1.25)

4.71 (1.45)

5.05 (1.17)

5.35 (0.93)

Group empathy

4.90 (1.55)

5.14 (1.28)

4.36 (1.59)

5.50 (1.61)

Superordinate
empathy

5.14 (1.56)

4.71 (1.45)

5.27 (1.55)

5.00 (1.66)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Table 11. Means and standard deviations of American-Wallonian overlap as a function of
experimental condition

Warmth
Warm

Cold

Competence

Competence

Competent

Incompetent

Competent

Incompetent

Perspective-taking
condition
Objective

3.57 (1.50)

2.75 (1.33)

2.86 (1.46)

3.20 (1.44)

Individual empathy

3.40 (1.64)

2.43 (0.98)

3.05 (1.53)

3.05 (1.61)

Group empathy

2.43 (0.81)

2.86 (1.31)

2.77 (1.48)

2.50 (1.40)

Superordinate
empathy

3.38 (1.40)

2.80 (1.40)

3.64 (1.43)

3.05 (1.85)

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Figure 1. Mean levels of distress as a function of perspective-taking instructions and competence stereotypes.
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Figure 2. Mean levels of effort as a function of perspective taking, warmth, and competence stereotypes.
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Questionnaire A: Helping Behavior Scale
Instructions: This study is investigating peoples’ perceptions of the degree to which
various helpful behaviors towards out-group members require effort and trust. Please
read the scenario below that describes a particular group. Listed below the scenario are
several helping behaviors that we’d like you to evaluate according to how much effort
and trust they would each require.
Effortful Behaviors are those that require conscious and focused trying in pursuit of a
goal. To require effort in this context means that you will need to dedicate time and/or
energy on behalf of others. Please rate the extent to which you perceive each behavior to
require effort on a scale of 0 (not at all effortful) to 9 (extremely effortful).
Trusting Behaviors are those that rely on the character, ability, and truth of another.
Trust in this context means that you would need to put faith in the character, ability, and
truth of members of this group before you could engage in the behaviors. Please rate the
extent to which you perceive each behavior to require trusting in the members of this
group on a scale of 0 (requires no trust) to 9 (requires a great deal of trust).
Scenario:
Due to political and economic circumstances, United States demographers are predicting
waves of immigration in the next few years from an ethnic group outside of our borders
that call themselves the Wallonians. Imagine that you are being asked to provide
assistance to the Wallonians. Please read each of the behaviors listed below, and indicate
how much effort and trust you think each behavior would require.
1. Read an informational flier describing the situation facing Wallonians in America.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

2. Volunteer to give a brief speech at an orientation meeting for Wallonians.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

3. Speak up if you see a shopkeeper or street vendor cheating Wallonians out of correct
change for purchases.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

4. Donate $5.00 to the cause of orienting Wallonians into United States society.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)
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5. Offer to write an article advocating Wallonians in your local newspaper.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

6. Offer to give directions to Wallonians who are obviously lost in your city.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

7. Help organize a benefit picnic in your community for Wallonians.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

8. Smile at Wallonians when you see them.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

9. Volunteer as an English language tutor to Wallonians on weekends.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

10. Sign a petition to bring the cause of the Wallonians to the attention of your local city
council.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

11. Invite Wallonian children to your home to play with your children (or your younger
brothers and sisters).
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

12. Invite a family (or families) of Wallonians to your home for a weekend barbeque.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

13. Participate in a parade or march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

14. Offer to host Wallonians in your home for a month while they become accustomed to
life in the United States.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)
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15. Campaign for legislation designed to benefit Wallonians.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

16. Introduce Wallonians to your personal friends.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

17. Offer to give rides to Wallonians in your personal car.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

18. Vote in support of social policies designed to benefit Wallonians.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

19. Volunteer to act as a city services tour guide for Wallonians.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

20. Hold doors open for Wallonians who are carrying heavy loads.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

21. Offer to jump a car for Wallonians who are stranded on the side of the road.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

22. Offer to help Wallonians dig out cars from underneath snow drifts in the winter.
____Effort (0 – 9)

____Trust (0 – 9)

101
Questionnaire B: Guttman Scales of Helping Behavior
Please check in the space next to the items below if you’d be willing to engage in the
following behaviors.
I. Effort
_____ Hold doors open for Wallonians carrying heavy loads.
_____ Offer to give directions to lost Wallonians.
_____ Invite Wallonians to a weekend barbeque at your home.
_____ Speak up if you see a Wallonian being cheated by a shopkeeper.
_____ Help organize a benefit picnic in the community for Wallonians.
Please check in the space next to the items below if you’d be willing to engage in the
following behaviors.
II. Trust
_____ Read an informational flier describing the situation of Wallonians in America.
_____ Donate $5.00 to helping Wallonians orient to Chicago.
_____ Participate in a parade or march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians.
_____ Introduce Wallonians to your personal friends.
_____ Offer to host Wallonians in home for a month.
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Questionnaire C: Demographic Questions
Please respond to the following demographic questions below.
1. What is your age? ________
2. What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
3. What is your ethnicity?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Caucasian
African-American / Black
Asian
Latino/a
Middle Eastern
Other (please indicate): _____________

4. To what extent do you perceive your family to be immigrants to America?
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very Much
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Questionnaire D: Perspective-Taking Instructions
Instructions:
This research is part of an effort to get student input regarding American society’s
reactions to groups of incoming immigrants. Due to political and economic
circumstances, United States demographers are predicting waves of immigration in the
next few years from an ethnic group outside of our borders that call themselves the
Wallonians. Several hundred Wallonians have already arrived in the United States, and
the government is interested in the experiences that they’ve had so far.
(Participants who will take the perspectives of groups as a whole will read one of the two
following paragraphs, depending on experimental condition):
Condition 1: Group Empathy Condition:
We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had
in Chicago. While you are reading the description, try to imagine how the Wallonians
feel about what has happened to them as a group, and how it affects their lives. Try to
feel the full impact of what the Wallonians have been through and how they feel as a
result. The description that follows has been translated from the Wallonian’s native
language.
Condition 2: Superordinate Empathy Condition:
We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had
in Chicago. Since America is a nation of immigrants, all citizens have in common that
our ancestors were immigrants into a new country. Because of this commonality, we
should all be able to understand the experience of getting used to life in a new country.
When reading the description that follows, consider the fact that all Americans (including
your ancestors) were immigrants at one time. Think about the experience described
below as an example of the difficulties associated with becoming new Americans in
general. That is, as you read the statement below, please consider how the Wallonians’
experience is similar to the experiences that face all groups of new Americans. Think
about how your own ancestors as well as other past immigrant groups felt as you think
about the Wallonians’ experience. While you are reading the description, try to imagine
how the Wallonians feel about what has happened to them, and how it affects their lives.
Try to feel the full impact of what the Wallonians have been through and how they feel as
a result. The description that follows has been translated from the Wallonian’s native
language.
(Participants who will take the perspective of individuals will read one of the two
following paragraphs, depending on experimental condition):
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Condition 3: Individual Empathy Condition:
We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had
in Chicago. While you are reading the description, try to imagine how the author of the
description feels about what has happened to him or her, and how it may have affected
his or her life. Try to feel the full impact of what the individual has been through and how
he or she feels as a result. The description that follows has been translated from the
Wallonian’s native language:
Condition 4: Individual Objective Condition:
We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had
in Chicago. While you are reading the description, try to be as objective as possible about
what has happened to the author. To remain objective, do not let yourself get caught up in
imagining what he or she has been through and how he or she feels as a result. Just try to
remain detached as you read the description. The description that follows has been
translated from the Wallonian’s native language:
(All participants will then read the following scenario):
My friends and I were traveling to see the sights downtown. We were not familiar with
Chicago’s bus and train system, and we ended up getting off the train a few stops early.
We decided to walk the remaining blocks to reach our destination, but we became
extremely lost. We could not make sense of the city maps we had, because we were not
familiar enough with English to understand many of the terms. We were quickly
overwhelmed by the noise and activity level of the city, and we quickly became
disoriented and confused. It was a very scary experience for us. How will we ever adjust
to life in this city?
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Questionnaire E: Empathic Concern
Participants will indicate the extent to which they experienced the following emotions on
a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely):
1. I felt sympathetic.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. I felt softhearted.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. I felt warm.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. I felt compassionate.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. I felt tender.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. I felt moved.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Questionnaire F: Personal Distress Scale
Participants will indicate the extent to which they experienced the following emotions on
a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely):
1. Alarmed
2. Troubled
3. Distressed
4. Upset
5. Disturbed
(Taken from: Maner, J. K., Luce, C. L., Neuberg, S. L., Cialdini, R. B., Brown, S., &
Sagarin, B. J. (2002). The effects of perspective taking on motivations for helping: Still
no evidence for altruism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1601-1610.)
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Questionnaire G: Procedural Justice-Helping Behaviors
All items will be measured on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).
1. How likely are you to vote in support of social policies designed to protect the rights
of Wallonians?
2. How likely are you to sign a petition to bring the cause of the Wallonians to the
attention of your local city council?
3. How likely are you to campaign for legislation designed to protect the rights of
Wallonians?
4. How likely are you to volunteer your time to raise money for a town hall meeting
where Wallonians can express their concerns?
5. How likely are you to support policies that take the perspective of the Wallonians into
account?
6. How likely are you to support community decisions that haven’t considered the
voices of the Wallonians?
7. How likely are you to support equal representation for Wallonians in community
decision-making?
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Questionnaire H: Group Identification
All items will be measured on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).
Group Attraction
1. How much do you like the Wallonians?
2. How much would you like to socialize with the Wallonians?
3. How much would you like to take a class with members of the Wallonians?
4. How much would you like to discuss issues with the Wallonians?
Group/Self Similarity
1. How similar are members of the Wallonians to people who are important to you?
2. How similar are members of the Wallonians to you?
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Questionnaire I : Inclusion of Other in Self Scales
1. Self / Wallonians overlap.
Instructions: Please circle the figure that best describes how you see the Wallonians in
relation to yourself.

Self Wallonians

Self

Self

Wallonians

Wallonians

Self

Self Wallonians

Wallonians

Self Wallonians

Self
Wallonians

2. Self / American overlap
Instructions: Please circle the figure that best describes how you see Americans in
relation to yourself.

Self Americans

Self

Self

Americans

Americans

Self

Self Americans

Americans

Self Americans

Self
Americans

3. American / Wallonian overlap
Instructions: Please circle the figure that best describes how you see the Wallonians in
relation to Americans.
Americans
Wallonians
Americans Wallonians Americans Wallonians
Americans

Americans

Wallonians
Americans

Wallonians

Americans
Wallonians

Wallonians
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